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ABSTRACT 
On 11 August, 1982, the Finance Minister of Mexico, Silvia Herzog informed the 
International Monetary Fund that Mexico was unable to meet its principle payments to its 
major creditors.  The economic crisis that ensued affected not just Mexico but the entire 
free market system.  It marked a fundamental shift in development economics and altered 
the economic systems in all but four Latin American countries.  Since the onset of the 
1982 Less–Developed–Countries (LDC) debt crisis, Mexico has suffered through 
numerous economic crises further restraining their potential for economic growth.  This 
thesis examines the historical background leading to the onset of the 1983 LDC debt 
crisis and the economic policies that the Mexican government and the international 
community enacted to economically recover. 
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Why did the implementation of economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, 
following the 1983 Less–Developed–Countries (LDC) debt crisis and the 1994 peso 
crisis, lead to slow economic growth in the Mexican economy?   In an effort to 
economically recover from the 1983 LDC debt crisis, as well as the 1994 peso crisis, 
Mexico, with the assistance of several International Governmental Organizations (IGO), 
implemented a series of structural economic reforms, fundamentally changing how the 
Mexican economy functions.  Although some of the reforms were successfully 
implemented, such as the liberalization of the Mexican economy, others were flawed 
from conception.  Due to this incorrect, inappropriate, or out of sequence implementation 
of the economic reform measures (as designed by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] 
and the Mexican Government), the Mexican economy has been trapped in a cycle of 
underperformance and restrained growth.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
For a quarter century, the effects of the 1983 LDC debt crisis have impacted Latin 
American countries.  Due to the magnitude of the 1983 debt crisis in Mexico, new 
economic policies and frameworks had to be developed.   These policies eventually 
became the basis for the Washington Consensus.  This resulting framework has been 








results have differed, sending some countries, such as Brazil, down the path towards 
greatness (according to Goldman, Sachs & Co in 2001),1 and others, such as Ecuador, 
towards perpetual indifference.2 
The 1983 LDC debt crisis has been concluded for close to twenty–five years, yet 
the underlying causes are still salient and continue to affect countries throughout the 
developing world.  A principle cause of the 1983 debt crisis proved to be the ability of 
Mexico to borrow considerable sums of capital from the international community based 
on future oil revenue.  This is an accepted practice throughout the economic community, 
however, it is still dangerous for countries whose primary source of revenue is highly 
volatile; for those countries such as oil rich Venezuela and Peru, with their copper 
exports, if they do not properly manage their capital inflows, it often times leads to 
excessive borrowing.  When the international price for their commodity drops, these 
countries are left with large current account deficits.  This large deficit, combined with 
continuing low international prices, leads to an inability to repay lenders. This is what 
occurred in Venezuela and in Peru (with an added variation in production costs in the 
Peruvian case) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.3  By understanding these basic 
economic concepts, countries have the ability to better manage their currency inflows and 
avoid similar mistakes that resulted in almost 30 years of underperformance of the 
Mexican economy. 
Through the study of the 1983 LDC debt crisis and Mexico’s inability to fully 
recover from it, this thesis will shed light on what went wrong in Mexico’s recovery and 
what other countries can do to avoid the pitfalls that they experienced.  Additionally, by 
                                                 
1  “BRIC: A Goldman Sachs Concept,” Goldman Sachs, http://www2.goldmansachs.com 
/gsam/individuals/products/growth_markets/bric/bric_concept/index.html (accessed on 15 December, 
2011). 
2 Samantha Newport, “Did the IMF Drop the Ball in Ecuador? (int'l edition),” Business Week, 24 
January, 2000.  http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_04/b3665160.htm  (accessed on 15 December, 
2011). 
3 “Peru:  Export and Import Structures,” Country Data,  http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-
10274.html (accessed on 15 December, 2011); Country Studies Series, “Peru - The Economy,” 
Mongabay.com,  http://www.mongabay.com/reference /country_studies/peru/ECONOMY.html (accessed 
on 15 December, 2011). 
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examining the errors made in Mexico, the IMF, World Bank and other IGO’s can further 
develop or refine their existing tactics and policies as they relate to the default of 
international debt. 
Not only is the 1983 LDC debt crisis an economically salient issue, it is also 
politically relevant.  The LDC debt crisis highlighted a myriad of political and social 
issues that Mexico needed to address.  These social and political issues range from 
increasing efficiency and decreasing corruption in the Mexican judicial system, to 
educational reforms required to raise the standard of human capital.  Social scientists 
from varying disciplines agree that until these issues are corrected, or at least addressed, 
Mexico’s economy will continue to be plagued by slow economic growth. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Given the extensive literature that is available on the LDC debt crisis, there is no 
shortage of answers in regard to this question, yet all of them have fallen short; Mexico’s 
economy is still trapped in a cycle of underperformance and restrained growth.4  There 
are several different possible answers as to why Mexico is experiencing slow economic 
growth.  One argument states that due to the rapid economic liberalization that Mexico 
experienced following the LDC debt crisis, their economy became increasingly exposed 
to the international market, thereby making it considerably vulnerable to external 
variables.5  Another possible hypothesis focuses on political explanations.  The PRI 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) has had a strong hold on Mexican politics for sixty–
six years and until they are no longer in control of the Mexican political machine, their 
economy will continue to perform at substandard levels.  Even though the PRI lost the 
2000 presidential election, they are still a strong player in Mexican politics; this argument 
focuses on favoritism, corruption and the PRI’s role in Mexican economic decisions.  
                                                 
4 Suárez-Mier, Manuel.  “Mexico’s Embassy to the United States.  Why Is Mexico Not Growing 
Faster?,” 1. 
5 Blecker, “External Shocks, Structural Change, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1979–2007,” 1. 
 4 
Until these issues are addressed, the Mexican economy will continue to be 
underproductive as a result of the inefficiencies that accompany corruption.6  A third 
argument focuses on a different cause of inefficiency; the economic inefficiencies that are 
the result of monopolistic and oligopolistic competition. Through abnormalities in the 
international economic system, monopolies and oligopolies inflate the value of their 
goods, thereby producing deadweight loss.  The presence of this deadweight loss causes 
inefficiencies in the international and national economic system.  Until these 
monopolistic and oligopolistic firms are dealt with, the Mexican economy will continue 
to be underproductive, thereby restraining economic growth.7    A final possible 
hypothesis centers on the idea that the reforms that were implemented in the 1980s and 
1990s restrained economic growth.8   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars such as Douglas North, Jeffry Frieden and Sidney Weintraub, as well as 
many others, have published works that examine why the Mexican economy has been 
trapped in a cycle of underperformance.  Even though considerable research has been 
completed on the topic, and numerous answers have been postulated, the Mexican 
economy remains trapped in an underproductive cycle that lacks economic growth.  
These possible explanations can be grouped into three categories; economic, social, and a 
mixture of the two called socioeconomic.9  
When looking at the economic arguments that have been presented, one of the 
most cited explanations focuses on external shocks to the economy.  More specifically, 
the rapid economic liberalization that Mexico experienced following the 1983 LDC debt 
crisis caused their economy to become increasingly exposed to the international market, 
                                                 
6 Elizondo and Santiso, Killing Me Softly, 2. 
7 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 200–206. 
8 Looney, Mexico on the Ropes, 60; Esquivel and Hernández-Trillo, “How Can Reforms Help Deliver 
Growth in Mexico?,” 193. 
9 The numerous explanations have been grouped into three classifications to assist in the organization 
of the large amount of literature present on the subject. 
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thereby making it considerably vulnerable to external variables.  This is the basis of 
Robert A. Blecker’s article, External Shocks, Structural Change, and Economic Growth 
in Mexico, 1979–2007.  He argues that, “Mexico’s various policies of opening and 
liberalization have made the country’s growth highly vulnerable to certain external 
constraints or ‘‘shocks” since the late 1970s.”10  His argument is not the only one based 
on external variables.  Some argue that due to Mexico’s liberalization and integration into 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mexican economy has become 
too dependent on external economies, namely the United States.11  
The generally accepted rebuttal to these arguments is that through diversified 
trading partners, as well as product diversity, any country has the ability to minimize their 
GDP volatility.12  Mexican leaders understood this concept and have taken measures to 
diversify their export’s markets.  The export portfolio of any country is always changing, 
however in 1986, Mexico was accepted into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT; the predecessor to the World Trade Organization [WTO]), and in 1994, NAFTA 
was signed into existence.13  As for a rebuttal to Sidney Weintraub’s argument regarding 
the ineffectiveness of NAFTA, the success of the free trade agreement is undoubtedly 
positive for all three countries, but especially for Mexico.  “Mexico used its NAFTA 
membership to effectively shift away from a heavy dependence on oil exports and 
towards a more diversified mix of higher value–added goods over the past two decades 
(once again proving that through trade diversification, the Mexican economy is better 
off).”14  Additionally, a 2005 report published by the World Bank stated that, “Mexico’s 
global exports would have been about 50 percent lower and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) would have been about 40 percent less without NAFTA.  Furthermore, the amount 
                                                 
10 Blecker, “External Shocks, Structural Change, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1979–2007,” 1. 
11 Weintraub, “An Economic Storm Hits Latin America,” 60. 
12 Jansen, Lennon, and Piermartini, Exposure to External Country Specific Shocks and Income 
Volatility, 15. 
13 Background notes on Mexico. U.S. State Department. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm#econ (accessed 11 November, 2011). 
14 Wise, “The North America Free Trade Agreement,” 145. 
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of time required for Mexican manufacturers to adopt U.S. technological innovations was 
cut in half . . . NAFTA made Mexico richer by about 4% of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita.”15  Even though the Mexican economy suffers from external shocks, 
through the use of free trade agreements, they have mitigated their risks, producing a 
more stable economy. 
Another possible economic explanation as to why the Mexican economy has not 
produced the growth that was expected following the LDC debt crisis, can be found in 
Gerardo Esquivel and Fausto Hernandez–Trillo’s chapter in Growing Pains in Latin 
America; An Economic Growth Framework as Applied to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Peru.  They state that, “the economic reform process has gone too far and 
that it has been unable to break the stranglehold of existing economic interest groups, and 
may even have made them more powerful.  This line of analysis concludes that the 
reform process should not continue and that some reforms may even need to be 
reversed.”16  Esquivel and Hernandez–Trillo do mention this line of reasoning is not well 
traveled in academic circles; however, the Mexican populace feels this is the underlying 
cause of their country’s slow growth. 
This argument could not be farther from the truth.  Had Mexico continued their 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, the country may have transitioned into 
a failed state.  Even scholars, such as Evelyne Huber, who is critical of neo–liberal 
economic policies understands that, “If the counterfactual is no reforms at all, i.e., a 
continuation of the ISI model as it was pursued from the 1950s to the 1970s, including 
what Michael Walton calls the "old–style populist redistributive agenda" (see Walton in 
this volume, 178), then the assessment of successes looks more favorable.”17  This 
viewpoint is supported by several IGO’s to include the World Bank and the IMF.  When  
 
                                                 
15 Lederman, Mahoney, and  Serve´n, Lessons from NAFTA, 2. 
16 Esquivel and Hernández-Trillo, “How Can Reforms Help Deliver Growth in Mexico?,” 193. 
17 Huber and Solt, “Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism,” 150. 
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viewing the Mexican current account deficit leading up to the financial meltdown that 
occurred in August of 1982, it would be impossible to continue without considerable 
foreign assistance.18  
An additional set of explanations that has been posed is based not on economic 
variables, but on social explanations.  This list is supported by countless scholars, social 
scientists, and social economists to include Larry Diamond and Stephen Morris.  Some 
items on the list include, but are not limited to:  poverty, corruption in all levels of the 
government, the war on drugs, a lack of educational opportunities and/or quality of 
education, lack of sufficient health care, and lack of an effective judicial system.  Even 
though none of these individual variables are sufficient to cause a lack of economic 
growth in Mexico, together they do represent a serious set of problems that must be 
addressed if Mexico hopes to increase their rate of growth. 
Poverty is a considerable problem in Mexico and must be addressed.  According 
to David Mayer–Foulkes’ article The Human Development Trap in Mexico, growth will 
not return until human capital has been fully exploited.  He claims that due to an 
underutilization of the provided school system, coupled with low levels of early 
childhood nutrition and poor health in adults, Mexico has developed a “long term, 
intergenerational, low human capital accumulation trap.”19  Until this problem is 
resolved, the foundations that Mexico requires to stimulate growth in their economy will 
continue to prove elusive.20 
Corruption is a problem that has plagued Mexico since its independence in 
August 1821, however, the level of corruption dramatically increased during the seventy 
plus years of single party rule through the PRI.  The most frequently cited hypothesis 
follows the argument of Paolo Mauro’s article, Corruption and Growth.  He finds that, 
                                                 
18 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 290. 
19 Mayer-Foulkes, “The Human Development Trap in Mexico,” 1. 
20 Mayer-Foulkes, “The Human Development Trap in Mexico,” 1. 
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“Corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth.”21  Several 
Latin American scholars have followed his premise, including Carlos Elizondo and Javier 
Santiso’s work on legal corruption, which focuses on certain entities, “privileged position 
to appropriate expenditure or avoid taxes,”22 to Stephen D Morris’ article, which focuses 
on the traditional illegal corruption in the Mexican Government.23  Mexico is not the 
only country that is experiencing problems with corruption.  According to the 2011, 
Corruption Perception Index, Mexico is a 3.0, Brazil is a 3.8, and India is a 3.1 (10 
represents no corruption and 0 represents complete corruption).24  This shows corruption 
alone is not enough to reduce a country’s overall economic growth, however, in 
combination with other socioeconomic factors, it presents a strong effect.25   
The same concept is present when viewing Mexico’s War on Drugs as it effects 
economic growth.   Although the War on Drugs effects economic growth, it alone does 
not represent the final solution.   Authors such as Gideon Rachman believe that Mexico 
would be on par with the BRICS if it were not being held back by it drug problems.26  He 
is not alone in his assessment; the Wharton Business School published an article that falls 
directly in line with Rachman’s thinking.  They believe that this War on Drugs, “is 
threatening the country's [Mexico’s] economic health and causing multinationals to 
                                                 
21 Mauro, “Corruption and Growth.” 3. 
22 Elizondo and Santiso, “Killing Me Softly, 2. 
23 Morris, “Corruption and the Mexican political system, 635. 
24 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011,” Transparency International, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (accessed on 10 January, 2012). 
25 Bannon, “The Fight Against Corruption: A World Bank Perspective,” (Paper prepared as part of the 
Consultative Group Meeting for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, May 25–28, 
1999, Stockholm, Sweden). 
http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/transparency_workshop6.htm (accessed on 11 
November, 2011). 
26 Gideon Rachman, “Why Mexico Is The Missing BRIC,” Financial Times-UK, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36d846a6-1a9a-11df-bef7-00144feab49a.html#axzz1dWJOcUxb (accessed 
on 11 November, 2011). 
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examine closely how they operate and invest in Mexico.”27  Although both of these 
publications are correct, the same could be said for Brazil.  “Brazil is the second–largest 
consumer of cocaine in the Americas” as well as, “Latin America's largest market for 
opiates or opioids.”28  Even though Mexico’s War on Drugs affects their economic 
growth rate, once again, it is not the singular cause of the sluggish Mexican economy. 
A strong educational foundation has been considered an essential building block 
for economic growth in any country.  This idea has been postulated through various 
endogenous–growth models.  The theory states that by increasing the quality of 
education, a country can increase its potential for growth.29  This theory has proven to be 
true in various studies through the use of empirically based research.  In David M. Gould 
and Roy J. Ruffin’s article What Determines Economic Growth, the idea of new product 
innovation is tied to increased economic growth.  Three different studies (Lucas 1988, 
Romer 1990, and Gorssman and Helpman 1991) have shown that as the accumulation of 
human knowledge increases, so does growth.  This can be attributed to “a relatively large 
stock of capital, a large educated population, or an economic environment that is 
favorable to the accumulation of human knowledge.”30  Additionally, studies conducted 
by “Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Well (1992), Levine and Renelt (1992)…have 
found evidence suggesting an educated populace is a key to economic growth.  A larger 
educated work force may increase growth either because of faster technological progress, 
as individuals building on the ideas of others, or by simply adding to the productive 
capacity of a country.”31  Even though these studies only briefly address the Latin 
American region (Guatemala is the only Latin American country that is studied), Elsa–
                                                 
27 “Mexico's Drug War: The Battle to Remain Safe, Low-cost and Competitive.”  Knowledge 
@Wharton, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2589 (accessed on 11 November, 
2011). 
28 “Brazil Drug Addiction and Treatment,” Narconon International, http://www.narconon.org/drug-
information/brazil-addiction-treatment.html (accessed on 15 December, 2011). 
29 Brown, Principles of Economics, 871. 
30 Gould and Ruffin, “What Determines Economic Growth,” 30. 
31 Gould and Ruffin, “What Determines Economic Growth,” 33. 
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Sofia Morote’s work titled, Higher Education, Employment and Economic Growth: 
Mexico and Peru focuses directly on Mexico.  Her study confirms the claims previously 
made by economists that quantity and quality of education are important foundations for 
economic growth.32  Even if one does not agree with the new endogenous growth 
models, the traditional model for growth, titled the Solow growth model, also holds an 
important, albeit, supporting role for human capital accumulation.33 
Effective judicial systems have long been touted as key principles of economic 
growth.  Scholars such as Richard E. Messick, argue that a, “well–performing judiciary is 
important for economic development.”34 Even though this concept has been present in 
the development and democratization literature for several years (see Larry Diamond’s 
work on “Consolidating Democracy in the Americas.”),35 only since the early 1990s have 
the IGOs that oversee judicial reform taken it into account.  This new found emphasis 
placed on institutions is in direct response to the lack of growth experienced in several 
Latin American countries following the implementation of the Washington Consensus in 
the 1990s.36 
The final classification considers the possibility that economic or social 
explanations alone do not possess the tools that are required to solve a problem of this 
magnitude.  Socioeconomic explanations combine individual aspects of both previously 
mentioned policy prescriptions to address the lack of growth in Mexico. 
In 1944 Karl Polanyi published, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time.  Polanyi’s argument, as summarized by Joseph Stiglitz in 
the foreword, states, “Self–regulating markets never work; their deficiencies, not only in 
                                                 
32 Morote, “Higher Education, Employment and Economic Growth: Mexico and Peru,” 10–11. 
33 Gould and Ruffin, “What Determines Economic Growth,” 33. 
34 Messick, “Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How,” 1. 
35 Diamond, “Consolidating Democracy in the Americas,” 18–19; This idea is also present in Linz and 
Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
36 Woo, “Serious Inadequacies of the Washington Consensus, 18–31. 
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their internal workings but also in their consequences, are so great that government 
intervention becomes necessary; and that the pace of change is of central importance in 
determining these consequences.”37  This argument turned the free market world of 
Adam Smith upside down and has become the basis for all future socioeconomic 
literature. 
In recent years, Polanyi’s work has been adapted and scholarship has focused on 
institutions and the role they play in sustained or reinvigorated economic growth.  The 
Nobel Prize winning Douglas North’s 1993 work on institutions and their role in 
economics is still considered groundbreaking work.  He argues that changes must be 
made to the neoclassical model to account for institutions and the role they play in long 
term economic growth.  He illustrates this point by looking at the differences between the 
Mexican and United States economies.  According to North, the current neoclassical 
model does not account for the difference in long term economic performance given the 
free market system.  The only method to account for these differences is through the 
inclusion of institutions to the current free market based neoclassical model.38  Other 
scholars have further developed and adapted the works of Polanyi and North to suit their 
area of expertise. 
One such scholar is Jeffry Frieden.  In his influential work, Debt, Development 
and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985, he examines 
how politically designed economic policies affected the 1983 LDC debt crisis.  He 
discovers that different economic interest groups placed considerable stress on each of 
five Latin American countries during the 1980 debt crisis, which had long lasting, 
adverse effects on the political landscape, as well as the economic future of all five 
                                                 
37 Stiglitz, “Foreword,” vii. 
38 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 107. 
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countries.39  Even though Frieden focuses on more of the economic indicators, he 
understands that social variables are equally important in explaining economic growth.40 
Peter Evans article compares the East Asian newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) with Latin American states through the lens of dependence theory.  His work 
argues that even though both groups of countries formed a triple alliance between private 
capital, transnational capital, and the state, the reason the East Asian NICs economies 
grew at a more substantial rate when compared to the Latin American states, is based on 
greater state intervention.41  This increased state intervention allowed the East Asian 
NICs to overcome the, “negative consequences of dependence.”42  This theory was tested 
on Marcus Kurtz’s work on Chile.  In “State Developmentalism Without a 
Developmental State: The Public Foundations of the ‘Free Market Miracle’ in Chile,” 
Kurtz claims that increased state intervention led to the success of three nontraditional 
exports in Chile.43  Even though both Evans and Kurtz’s work on increased state 
intervention is not based on Mexico, they both are excellent examples of socioeconomic 
alternatives to the purely economic approach of neo–liberal reforms. 
Stephan Haggard argues that, “variations in the social organization of agriculture, 
the timing of labor mobilization, and the interests and strength of domestic entrepreneurs 
provide the permissive social conditions underlying the divergent development 
trajectories of…Mexico.”44  Even though his phrase, “permissive social conditions” is 
ambiguous by nature, it shows that more than just economics plays a role in the growth of 
the Mexican economy. 
                                                 
39 Freiden, Debt, Development, and Democracy, 3. 
40 Freiden, Debt, Development, and Democracy, 4–5. 
41 Evans, “Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia:  Lessons for Latin Americanists,” 221. 
42 Evans, “Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia,” 212. 
43 Kurtz, “State Developmentalism Without a Developmental State, 1. 
44 Haggard, “The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System,” 346. 
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Manual Pastor and Carol Wise argue that the success of Mexico’s trade reform in 
the 1980s was due to the organizational overhaul of Mexico’s government at the state 
level.45  Even though institutions are important in explaining trade policy and subsequent 
growth in Mexico, they feel that it is only part of the story.  Like Friedman, they argue 
that global political–economic structures, as well as institutions, are key in explaining 
Mexico’s growth and trade policy following the 1983 LDC debt crisis.46 
Pamela Starr loosely follows the analytical framework that Freidman describes in 
his Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 
1965–1985.  Pamela Starr follows Friedman’s framework by theorizing that in order for 
economic policies to be effective, they must be properly constructed.  The body that 
constructs and recommends these policies is a political entity.  Therefore, in order to 
achieve lasting, and meaningful economic change (as was needed in Mexico following in 
the 1983 LDC debt crisis and the 1994 peso crisis), “political decentralization, judicial 
reform, public administration, civil society” and other socioeconomic institutions need to 
be included in the reform process.47 
This thesis is not attempting to refute the fact that these socioeconomic variables 
have undoubtedly played a role in Mexico’s lack of growth; they surely have, however, 
even if all of these socioeconomic conditions were corrected, Mexico still would not have 
grown.  The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were insufficient and poorly implemented. 
The Mexican economy was thus trapped in a cycle of underperformance and slow 
growth. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
An in depth historical approach will be required to answer why Mexico’s economy is 
lacking growth. Research will be conducted on both the 1983 LDC debt crisis, as well as 
                                                 
45 Pastor and Wise, “The Origins of Mexico’s Free Trade Policy,” 182. 
46 Pastor and Wise, “The Origins of Mexico’s Free Trade Policy,” 470. 
47 Starr, “The Political Economy of Reform in Latin America, 225. 
 14 
the 1994 peso crisis.  In addition to the historical review of the actual crises, the 
subsequent policies that were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s will also be reviewed.  
In general, the policies that were implemented can be grouped into two general 
categories:  economic and political.  This thesis will focus mainly on the economic 
reforms.  By showing that the economic reforms were poorly implemented, this thesis 
will show the dangers of following an economic framework in a haphazard manner.  The 
IMF and World Bank policies were designed to work in conjunction with each other 
hence any deviation from complete implementation will result in a failed economic 
policy.  Following the historical review of the crises, this thesis will study each of the sub 
categories of economic reform and determine if the reforms were implemented properly 
and more importantly, fully.  If all of the policies were implemented correctly, then the 
reforms should have resulted in economic growth.  If they were not implemented 
correctly, then the policies should have failed.  Once a determination has been made on 
each of the subcategories, the overall economic framework and reform policies can be 
judged as successful or unsuccessful.  If one or all of the categories are determined to be 
unsuccessful, an attempt will be made to point to a reason why the method of 
implementation was unsuccessful and recommend a policy to correct the deficiency.  As 
is always the case, there is some basic level of background, or theoretical information that 
is necessary to understand each subcategory.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I will be an introductory chapter and will contain a revised version of this 
thesis proposal.  Chapter II examines the causes of the 1983 LDC debt crisis and the 1994 
peso crisis as it relates to Mexico.  There is an inherent need to be well versed in the 1983 
LDC debt crisis to determine why the 1994 peso crisis occurred, as well as why Mexico 
has experienced sluggish economic growth.  The cause of the 1983 LDC debt crisis will 
directly relate to the type and methods of implementation of the economic reforms that 
were recommended by the IMF and World Bank.  Chapter III delves into the actual 
reforms that were recommended.  The economic reforms that were enacted in Mexico are 
a direct result of the policies of ISI.  Due to this reason, a historical discussion will be 
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conducted in regard to the ISI model of development and the problems that it entails.  
The economic reforms can be broadly grouped into five categories; Trade Liberalization 
(Section B, Chapter III), Combat of Monopoly Power (Section C Chapter III), 
Controlling Inflation (Section IV Chapter III), Structural Changes in the Tax System 
(Section V, Chapter III), and the Banking Reform (Section VI, Chapter III).  Each of the 
individual sections concerning the structural reforms that were enacted will look at the 
principles of the related economic theory, the nature of the problem that Mexico faced in 
their dealings with each problem, and the actual policy.  Chapter IV will address the 
weakness of each of the reforms that were enacted and why the policies did not work.  
The conclusion (Chapter V) of this thesis is concerned with what is the next step in 
restoring growth to the Mexican economy.  In this section of the thesis, a discussion of 
the socioeconomic problems that were briefly introduced in the literature review will be 
conducted, specifically concerning why they are important in an economic recovery plan.  
More importantly Chapter V will review the findings of the thesis and show how they 
could be applied in future policies of NGO/IGO’s to help countries in their economic 
recovery. 
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Chapter II serves to provide a historical overview of the 1983 Less–Developed–
Countries (LDC) debt crisis, the economic reforms that followed, and the role those 
reforms played regarding the onset of the 1994 peso crisis.  Even though no major 
analysis is conducted in this chapter regarding the onset of both financial crises; several 
contributing factors immediately become apparent.  First, as in most countries that 
contain significant natural resources, oil futures played a considerable role in the inflow, 
and subsequent outflow of foreign capital.  Second, the lack of transparency present 
throughout the Mexican financial institutions greatly influenced severity of both crises.  
Finally, many of the reform packages that were implemented following the 1983 debt 
crisis were being put into practice in the real world for the first time.  Even though there 
had been numerous financial crises throughout history, the international financial 
institutions had not developed the tools needed to cope with a crisis on such a scale as 
Mexico represented.  This led to considerable delays due to ineffective management on 
an international scale.   By the end of Chapter II, the historic foundations will be in place, 
allowing the economic analysis of the reform packages to begin. 
B. HISTORY OF THE LESS–DEVELOPED–COUNTRY DEBT CRISIS 
This section focuses on the background knowledge that is required to analysis the 
1983 LDC debt crisis and the 1994 Peso crisis.  By delving into the history of the events 
leading up to both crises, a better understanding can be achieved that will aid in the 
critical review of the economic reform packages that were designed to place Mexico back 
on a path towards sustained economic growth.  This section has been subdivided into 
several segmented periods of time.  The first segment covers from 1973 to 1979. The 
second is from 1979 until the start of the LDC debt crisis in Mexico in August 1982.  The 
third starts with Mexico’s announcement that their economy was insolvent in August 
1982 and continues until the installation of the Baker Plan in late 1987.  The final period 
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covers the implementation of the Baker Plan.  Given the fact that the reforms that were 
implemented throughout the 1980s, are contributing factors to the 1994 Peso crisis, 
separating the two events becomes problematic, however, experts such as Nora Lusting, 
Robert Looney, and Timothy Curry feel that by the end of the decade, the crisis was for 
the most part, under control.48 
Before proceeding with the historical narrative of the LDC debt crisis, it is 
important to understand how the loans that Mexico was receiving were structured.  Most 
of the loans to the Mexican economy were processed through the Eurodollar Market.  
Due to this fact, the terms of the loan were negotiated using United States dollars.  
Furthermore, because United States dollars were the currency of the loan, they had to be 
repaid using United States dollars.  As the interest rate climbed in the U.S., the amount of 
money that was required to pay back the loans was in essence, growing.49  In addition to 
the interest rate component of the Eurodollar loans, a great majority had a medium to 
long term maturity.  Finally, the terms of the loan were constructed around the London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), not United States dollar interest rates.50   
Why start the historical narrative in 1973? Given the fact that Mexico’s economy 
is heavily dependent on oil exports, it seems only logical to start in October of 1973; it 
was then that the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) raised 
the price of crude oil 70% while simultaneously cutting production at a 5% a month rate 
until certain political objectives were met.51  Because Mexico was not a member country 
of OAPEC, they were not limited by the terms of the embargo.52  This allowed Mexico to 
export oil at an increased percentage thus fueling their unprecedented economic growth.  
                                                 
48 Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, vi; Looney, “Politics of Global Economic 
Relations,” Class Lecture. 
49 Curry, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s, 192–195. 
50 Curry, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s, 192–195. 
51 Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 589. 
52 “OAPEC Members,” Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
http://www.oapecorg.org/en/aboutus /members.htm (accessed on 21 August 2011). 
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In 1973 alone, Mexico’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an amazing 
7.86%.53  This is well above the world GDP average growth rate of 6.61% in 1973.54  
This high preforming economy, fueled by increased oil revenues, made the Mexican 
economy a prime target for foreign investment.55  Foreign banks and multinational 
corporations were sitting on large sums of capital (in large part due to the Eurodollar 
Market) and were in search of a good investment.56  With the amazing growth that was 
occurring throughout Latin America, GDP averaging anywhere from 4–6% annually, the 
banks and multinational corporations decided to invest strongly in Latin American 
countries.57  Even though the embargo implemented by OAPEC ended in March of 1974, 
oil prices stayed at an elevated level throughout the decade; peaking at close to $38 per 
barrel in 1980 (this is equivalent to approximately $103 per barrel in today’s market).58  
Because of this steady increase in oil prices throughout the 1970s, Mexico appeared to 
have no issues servicing its ever increasing foreign investment debts.  Because Mexico 
was a net oil exporter, they were able to offset their increasing debt payments to foreign 
banks and multinational corporations using their increased oil revenue.  Because Mexico 
was able to continue to service their debts, or balance their payments, foreign banks and 
multinational corporations continued to increase the amount of money they were lending 
to them; thus creating a cyclical effect based on a fairly unstable export economy.59  
                                                 
53 Google Public Data Explorer Labs, World Development Indicators (subset), 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&
met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX&ifdim=region
&tdim=true&hl=en_U.S.&dl=en_U.S. (accessed on 04 April, 2012). 
54 Google Public Data Explorer Labs, World Development Indicators (subset), 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&
met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_kd_zg&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX&ifdim=region
&tdim=true&hl=en_U.S.&dl=en_U.S. (accessed 04 April, 2012). 
55 Curry, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s, 192. 
56 Curry, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s, 192. 
57 Beek, “Commercial Bank Lending to the Developing Countries,” 1. 
58 “Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)” Inflation Data.com, 
http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate /historical_oil_prices_table.asp (accessed on 21 
August 2011). 
59 Curry, An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s, 192. 
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Following the oil crisis of 1973, the world experienced a recession starting in 1974 that 
lasted through 1975.  But because Mexico’s economy was based on an ISI model, in 
addition to being an oil exporting country, they did not feel the effects of the recession 
like a free market economy or oil importer did. Mexico’s real GDP growth rate did drop 
from 7.86% in 1973 to 5.74% in 1975; however, the world average for the same time 
period decreased from 6.61% to 1.09%.60  Mexico was able to mitigate this drop in GDP 
growth due to increased oil production and subsequent oil exportation.  From 1970 to 
1980, Mexican oil production increased from 500,000 barrels per day (BPD) to over 2 
million BPD.61  Following the recession, things continued, relatively unchanged for 
Mexico until 1979. 
The second phase of the narrative begins just as the first; with a major financial 
shock to the global economic system. This occurred in 1979 with the second (or 1979) oil 
crisis.  Due to a violent regime change in Iran, Iranian oil supply to the United States was 
at first limited, then suspended all together.62  Just as before, Mexico was able to increase 
production just as prices for oil were at their highest in nearly a decade.  In the United 
States, the reduced oil supply proved to be just another problem for the struggling 
economy.  Since 1978, the U.S. economy had been plagued by under productivity, high 
rates of unemployment, and increased inflationary pressure.  In order to promote growth 
and break the cycle of general stagflation, the United States Federal Reserve, under the 
new leadership of Paul Adolph Volcker, Jr., increased interest rates from 5.67% in 1980 
                                                 
60 Google Public Data Explorer Labs, World Development Indicators (subset), 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&
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61 GraphOilogly.  Mexico's Ability to Export Oil.  Last modified 13 March, 2006.   
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62 “The Iranian Oil Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation, 
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to an all–time high of 20% in January 1981.63  While this is clearly not favorable for 
consumers in the United States, it proved far worse for the Mexican economy. 
While the second oil crisis was occurring in the United States, Mexico was 
continuing to acquire more and more public debt through international lending.  In 1973, 
Mexico’s debt was $4 billion.  By 1981, their debt had skyrocketed to $43 billion; this 
was an astounding 30% increase in debt per year.64  During this period of increased 
lending, Mexico exhibited almost no economic warning signals, due in large part to their 
ability to finance their debt.  Mexico’s total debt to GDP ratio for 1981 was only 41.7%, 
averaging only 4.5% of GDP.65  During this period of economic prosperity the Mexican 
economy became increasingly dependent on the oil sector; by 1981, oil revenues 
accounted for 72.5% of total exports of goods and services.66  During the early months of 
1981, the unthinkable happened in Mexico; the oil market started a downward slide.   
Next, Mexico made a disastrous decision; with oil prices dropping, the government 
decided to leave national oil prices untouched.  This decision made Mexican oil the only 
oil on the world market to hold steady as the rest of the world’s oil was dropping in price.  
This unprecedented behavior centered on the belief that Mexican oil was of a higher 
quality than the rest of the world’s oil.67  This move led to an expected drop in Mexican 
oil exports.  This drop was a full 25% below Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) projections.68  
It is impossible to understand just how much money was lost due to this disastrous 
decision, but at the same time as oil exports in Mexico were falling, external borrowing 
                                                 
63 United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Prospects for Economic Recovery 
(Washington D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1982), 26. 
64 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 282. 
65 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 282; Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time is 
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68 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 283. 
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increased to over $18.3 billion.69  Even though this increase in borrowing is not a direct 
correlation (as borrowing would have increased regardless of the price of oil), there is no 
doubt at this point in Mexico’s economic situation, there would have been an increase in 
borrowing, just not to the magnitude that was apparent.  Mexico’s economy was in 
serious trouble, and it had become fully apparent to the international community as well 
as the national sector.70  To calm fears a decision was made that a policy shift needed to 
occur, unfortunately, a consensus could not be reached as to the nature of the policy.  Due 
to this lack of an effective and timely decision, the private sector in Mexico started 
transitioning their savings from domestic banks to international banks.71  Even though 
the IMF had been keeping a close eye on Mexico, this massive outflow of currency set 
off alarms throughout the IMF as well as other international monetary institutions.  The 
IMF sent a mission down to Mexico to evaluate their current situation, and the team 
reported the following: 
…the prospects for fiscal adjustment were limited, the outlook for 
economic activity was poor, the exchange rate (which was fixed against 
the U.S. dollar) was inconsistent with a price level that was inflating more 
rapidly all the time, and debt service was likely to rise sharply.72 
On 17 February 1982, the Mexican central bank made the decision to temporarily 
remove itself from the foreign exchange market and let the peso “float” in the 
international market.  The hope was that once the peso was stable domestically, it would 
be placed back on the foreign exchange market.  Within a week of this decision, the peso 
had dropped more than 40% compared to the U.S. dollar.73  Unfortunately, any gains that 
the Mexican economy had accomplished with this brave step were made null and void 
due to other economic policies; most notably, the increase in the minimum wage (more 
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than likely this was a political move more than anything else).  This “disorderly 
adjustment” further exasperated capital flight (between 1979 and 1982, $26.5 Billion 
U.S. dollars exited Mexico and landed in U.S. Banks) and led to an eventual price 
freeze.74  By April 1982, major businesses that were backed by the Mexican government 
started to default on their loans.  The largest of which, Alfa Group, defaulted on its 
principle payment to foreign banks to a tune of $2.3 billion.75  Additionally, by the end of 
April 1982, for the first time, Mexico drew the maximum $800 million on the swap line 
from the United States Federal Reserve in order to remain solvent.76  By now, the IMF 
and Mexico’s government were in constant negations and it was clear that unless Mexico 
was able to continue to receive foreign loans, it would be unable to continue to balance 
its books.77  The Mexican government knew that it would have to continue to make 
drastic spending cuts in order to even come close to balancing its budget.  By this time, 
the Mexican government was pleading with foreign investors to continue lending.78  
Surprisingly, several foreign banks did continue to negotiate new loans with the Mexican 
government (given how much the foreign banks already had invested in Mexico, there 
was really no other choice).79  Throughout this time of financial unrest, foreign banks 
were becoming increasingly weary of dealings with Mexico.  This weariness materialized 
in the decrease in maturity dates of the new loans being issued to Mexico.  Maturity dates 
for Eurodollar loans were traditionally medium to long term.  By mid–1982, only short 
term loans were being offered to the Mexican government.  In addition, due to the 
widening interest rate gap between LIBOR, the Mexican peso, and the United States 
dollar, banks understood that Mexico was going to have a very hard time repaying their 
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loans.80  Mexico did start to adjust their financial policy—promising public spending cuts 
as well as cutting the fiscal deficit by 3%.81  Both of these measures were accomplished, 
but the damage was done.  By this point, everyone knew that Mexico’s fate relied on their 
ability to ensure foreign public financing.82  Even through the IMF had considerable 
clout on the world economic stage, they could not force the public corporations and 
foreign banks to continue to fund a sinking ship.  The banking sector had learned its 
lesson in their dealings with Alfa Group, and they instituted a new policy; in order for 
Mexico to continue to receive financing from the public sector, the banks demanded 
principle repayment of their current loans on time, with no exceptions.  On 4 August 
1983, Mexico’s central bank again withdrew another $700 million from the swap line 
with the U.S. Federal Reserve.83  This proved to be insufficient and on the 11th of 
August 1982, the Finance Minister of Mexico, Silvia Herzog informed the IMF that 
Mexico was unable to meet its principle payments to its major creditors that were due on 
Monday, 16 August, 1982.84 
Now that the crisis was in full swing (the beginning of the third phase), the real 
work began.  As soon as this occurred, the IMF notified Volcker (the current chairman of 
the United States Federal Reserve) who immediately phoned all of the major holders of 
the debt that would be defaulted on by Mexico.  This included the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland, the Bank of England in London, the Bank of Japan, and 
the Bank of Tokyo in Japan.  Before 1982 was over, the United States had extended a $1 
billion swap line of credit to Mexico in addition to already paying $4.6 billion dollars of 
Mexican debt.  Even though the U.S. was the primary holder of the debt, this was an 
international effort.  BIS gave Mexico $925 million, France, Israel, and Spain accounted 
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for $550 million, the IMF accounted for $3.86 billion, and commercial banks, in addition 
to allowing the principle payments to slide, gave an additional $5 billion.85 
Now that funds had been allocated to steam an immediate worldwide financial 
meltdown, the Mexican economy had to be stabilized.  The first stabilization program 
that was instituted in Mexico was the Programa Inmediato de Feordenacion Economica 
(Program of Immediate Economic Reorganization, or PIRE).  PIRE was a two stage 
policy:  first, a “shock treatment” would be instituted in 1983, followed by “gradualist” 
policies (running from 1984–1985).86  The shock treatment consisted of a large 
devaluation of the free and controlled exchange rates, increases in tax and non–tax 
revenues, and a further decrease in public spending.87  Now that a short run solution was 
implemented, Mexico turned its attention to the repayment of debt. 
In order to Mexico to successfully be able to repay their debt, an agreement had to 
be reached where either debt could be reduced or rescheduled.  The solution to this 
problem was FICORCA (Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiarios – 
loosely translated it means Trust for Hedging) program, which allowed Mexican firms to 
reschedule repayments of foreign debt and make payments in pesos to the Mexican 
central bank.  Once the bank received the required amount of payments, it would send out 
dollar payments to the foreign creditors.  This program ended up being of vital 
importance, ensuring Mexico would not have to continually draw on the swap line of 
credit to ensure repayments occurred on schedule. This policy proved to be a tremendous 
success for the Mexican government, accounting for over $12 billion in debt repayment 
by year end.88  Even though the current account deficit was reduced at a greater rate than 
PIRE projected (3.6% of GDP as opposed to –2.2%) due in part to FICORCA, Inflation, 
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Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), and real GDP growth goals were all not 
achieved.89  Even with PIRE lackluster performance, Mexico did not experience any 
unexpected financial shocks and by the years end, a policy program for repayment was 
approved for 1984.   
1984 marked the beginning of the “gradualists” phase of PIRE; its goals included 
“a slower deceleration of inflation, further improvement of the trade surplus, and 
resumption of the historical growth rates.”90  These goals would be accomplish through 
controls on exchange rates, minimum wage levels, and the prices of consumer goods and 
services.91  In addition to the implementation of phase two of PIRE, several major 
financial hurdles were cleared in 1984; one major issue was an additional loan made 
through private banks to the tune of $3.8 billion to ensure that the balance of payments 
for the year end could be achieved.  Once again, the commercial banks were loaning 
more and more money to ensure that things did not get any worse throughout the world.  
Additionally, a Multiyear Rescheduling Agreement (MYRA) plan was set in place to 
ensure that the IMF would be allowed to continue to monitor the progress made by 
Mexico in exchange for continued private bank support for the country.92  MYRA 
included a semiannual inspection of Mexico’s balance of payment sheets and a review of 
policy implementations.  This was designed to help ease tension in the banking sector by 
shifting from single year agreements to multiyear, medium term loan and policy 
agreements.  The agreement between Mexico, the IMF, World Bank, and the private 
sector that allowed the passage of the MYRA plan, was a huge breakthrough in the 
rescheduling of payments.  On 8 September 1984, the private banking sector agreed to a 
rescheduling of $55 billion in loans due to mature between 1985 and 1990.93  In addition 
to lengthening the maturity of the loans, interest rates spread as compared to the LIBOR 
                                                 
89 Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 34–35. 
90 Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 34. 
91 Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 34. 
92 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 364–369. 
93 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 368. 
 27 
were reduced.94  By mid–1984, there was consensus between the major lenders and the 
Mexican government that a mild economic recovery was in full swing; however, this 
optimism was short lived.   
By years end in 1984, the PIRE policies designed to combat inflation backfired.  
The decision to relax the fiscal stance and allow the exchange rate to appreciate led to a 
rapid deterioration of the trade surplus. To make matters worse, non–oil exports 
decreased and oil export revenues declined 11%.95  This resulted in the PIRE, once again 
not meeting its inflation reduction or PSRB goals.  Real GDP growth and the reduction of 
the current account deficit goals were achieved, however, there was little actual progress 
made on correcting the root cause of the 1983 LDC debt crisis.96 Even with this lack 
luster performance, all IMF policy goals were achieved and, 1985s policy goals had been 
agreed upon. 
The economic downturn that took place in 1984 continued into 1985. 
Improvements in the balance of payments were coming at the expense of imports and not 
through trade liberalization.97  Additionally, the exchange rate was becoming seriously 
overvalued again.  A third setback occurred when the president informed the IMF that a 
wage increase of at least 10% was due to the public.98  The IMF regarded this as the 
wrong policy given the ongoing problems with inflation, however, there were political 
implication if the wage increase was not implemented.  Finally, the straw that broke the 
camel’s back was placed in October 1985.  The IMF was informed that Mexico was 
going to be unable to meet the performance criteria required to ensure funding for the  
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following year.99  The peso continued to devaluate and given the lack of policy 
objectives met in 1985, the IMF was unable to approve policy objectives for 1986.  Given 
the peso’s devaluation on the global economic market, it was allowed to float for the first 
time since the LDC crisis began.100   
Not everything in 1985 was for the worse.  In 1984 a decision had been made to 
start the liberalization of the economy in 1985.  The initial goals were to liberalize 35% 
to 45% of total imports by years end.101  Even though this was accompanied by an 
increase in tariffs, the importance of this shift cannot be underestimated.  For the first 
time in nearly 30 years, Mexico was officially adopting an outward growth model. 
As 1985 drew to an end, Mexico officially abandoned PIRE and a new program 
needed to be developed.102  Just when Mexico thought that it could not get any worse, a 
series of earthquakes centered near Mexico City destroyed infrastructure and caused 
massive public suffering.103  Even though the IMF allowed emergency funding, the 
damage to the infrastructure was immense and would take months to correct, setting 
Mexico’s economic progress back yet again.  When the numbers were tallied, the 
earthquakes cost Mexico an estimated 3.5% of their GDP, and to make matters worse, $1 
billion in principle repayments were coming due (these were allowed to slip and were 
eventually rescheduled).104 
Throughout the turmoil in 1985, the Mexican government attempted to make 
considerable strides in reorganizing their economic structure, but due to the previously 
mentioned issues, it led to little, actual results.  However, in 1986 (the fourth phase of the 
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historical narrative), things did change considerably on the structural side.  It was clear 
that even though things in Mexico were improving, the underlying cause of the lack of 
growth had yet to truly be addressed; ISI.  In order to actually fix the problem, a 
structural transformation needed to occur.  In 1985, banks started to pull most of their 
future financing out of LDC indebted countries and by 1986, the flow had reversed.105  
On a positive note, the United States dollar had started to depreciate in March of 1985.106  
Another positive aspect is MYRA was working and in Mexico from 1986 through 1989, 
the average $9.6 billion dollar yearly payment had be rescheduled to a merger $1.1 
billion a year payment.107   
In the midst of this chaos, a plan to fix the structural issues that was plaguing 
Mexico was developed.  U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, James A. Baker III, developed a 
plan which consisted of three main parts that were designed to actually increase growth 
and reduce debt simultaneously.108 
First, principle debtor countries should adopt a comprehensive 
macroeconomic and structural policies, which must be supported by the 
international financial community, to promote growth and balance of 
payments adjustment and to reduce inflation.  Second, a continued central 
role for the IMF is called for, in conjunction with increased and more 
effective structural adjustments lending by the multilateral development 
banks in support of the adoption by principal debtors of market–oriented 
policies for growth.  Third, private banks should increase their lending in 
support of comprehensive economic adjustments programs.109 
His plan was revolutionary, but there still was a lack of empirical evidence (at the 
time) that actually linked structural reforms with growth.110  In order to accomplish these 
                                                 
105 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 415. 
106 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 416. 
107 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 416. 
108 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin American Since Independence, 360; Bowe and 
Dean, Has the market solved the sovereign-debt crisis?, 6. 
109 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 417. 
110 Boughton, Silent Revolution, 418; Bowe and Dean, has the market solved the sovereign-debt 
crisis?, 1. 
 30 
goals, he recommended that the World Bank and the Inter–American Development Bank 
increase their funds to LDC nations by 50%.  In addition, he wanted to ensure that 
commercial banks provide a minimum of $20 billion to the 15 most indebted countries 
between the years of 1986 and 1989.111  Even though his policy was, for the most part, 
adopted with very few changes by the IMF and the World Bank, and his targeted cash 
flows to indebted countries were, for the most part accomplished, little actual growth 
occurred directly due to the Baker Plan.112  This was not due to the structure of his plan, 
but events outside his control.  First, in 1986, due to price competition and production 
cutbacks by OPEC members, oil prices decreased from $25.5 per barrel in 1985 to $12.00 
per barrel in 1986.113  Second, in 1987, Brazil announced a moratorium on debt 
services.114  These two events created a false appearance of success, however, in the long 
run, the Baker Plan produced little real growth for Mexico or any other LDC debt crisis 
country.115  By the end of 1986, thing in Mexico were as bad as they had been since the 
beginning of the LDC debt crisis: real GDP fell by 3.8% as a result of the oil price 
decrease, the peso depreciated 46%, inflation was measured at 105.7% in December of 
1986, and real wages dropped between 6 and 11%.116 
The policy that did make drastic changes was implemented in December 1987, 
during the second year of the Baker Plan.  The Mexican government reached an 
agreement with the labor unions in Mexico to stop devaluing the peso at rates equal to, or 
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higher, than the inflation rate.117  The actual plan that the Mexican government decided 
to peruse was to restrain wages and prices.118  In other words, a comprehensive income 
policy was finally attempted to reduce inflation.119  The agreement became known as the 
Economic Solidarity Pact (Pacto de Solidaridad Económica or Pacto for short).  Pacto 
ended up being extremely effective.   It further helped reduce public spending and 
implemented a complete overhaul of the Mexican tax system.  In addition, Pacto played a 
key role in promoting trade liberalization and also started breaking up key state 
monopolies to include the ever important banking reform.  Quite possibly, the biggest 
measurable change was a reduction of the inflation rate.  Between the time Pacto was 
implemented in late 1987, to the end of 1988, inflation fell from 159% to 52%.120  
Though Pacto was making tremendous progress in controlling and reducing the inflation 
rate in Mexico, by 1988 a new economic crisis began to simmer.  In order to understand 
how the 1994 peso crisis erupted, it is important to understand how Pacto was designed to 
work. 
Pacto, was an agreement between the labor unions, key private business leaders, 
and the government.  Pacto worked by using income policy and exchange rate targeting 
to induce inflation stabilization in Mexico.  In more practical terms, this amounted to 
labor agreeing to limit wage inflation, the key business leaders agreeing to limit price 
inflation, and the government contributing through the use of public sector price and the 
exchange rate stability.121  This agreement however, had several untended consequences.  
Even though Pacto was very successful at reducing the inflation rate of the Peso, it also 
possessed the potential to produce “significant real exchange rate overvaluation, loss of 
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competitiveness, and very large trade deficits.”122  In Mexico’s case, even though these 
potential problems were a very real concern, the necessity to reduce inflation outweighed 
the potential risks.  Additionally, the Mexican government was confident that Pacto 
would not lead to another financial crisis for several reasons:  “first the policy started 
from a situation of undervaluation; second, Mexico had ample international reserves; and 
third, a rapid rate of productivity growth was supposed to compensate for the 
appreciation of the Peso.”123  Even though the Mexican government was optimistic they 
could manage the inflationary drawdown without inducing a follow–on economic crisis, 
they were unsuccessful; Mexico was unable to use Pacto to reduce inflation without real 
appreciation of the exchange rate.124    
Mexico’s inability to avoid a second financial crisis in as many decades was the 
result of several factors.  Some include individual actions on the part of the Banco de 
México (Central Bank of Mexico) and the Mexican government.  Just as Pacto played a 
key role in the onset of the 1994 peso crisis, so did the Mexican government’s decision to 
open or liberalize the capital account early in the neo liberal reform process.125  As is 
important in all economic frameworks, the order in which a government chooses to 
implement key policy decisions will impact the economy in very different ways.  One 
consequence of the 1989 decision to relax capital controls was the subsequent inflow of 
short term capital into the Mexican economy.  Just as in 1983, this large inflow of capital 
into the system, fueled expenditures that created a consumption boom, put additional 
pressure on an ever increasing real exchange rate, and further fueled the increase in the 
current–account deficit.126  In addition to this chain of events, private savings declined 
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considerably for the last few months of 1989.127  For the remainder of the 1980s, Mexico 
seemed to be moving towards economic stability, due in large part to their neo liberal  
 
reform package.  It was still too early to tell that the actions of the Mexican government 
and the Banco de México had inadvertently placed Mexico on a path towards a second 
economic crisis in as many decades. 
In the early 1990s, Mexico was being hailed as a model of neo liberal reform and 
the praises that were being showered down were taking the form of more than just 
words.128  From 1990–1993, international investment in Mexico had returned.  During 
the Salinas administration, the Banco de México was able to attract over $50 billion 
dollars in cumulative foreign investment.129  Even though they were receiving 
considerable attention from IGO’s and Multinational Corporations, problems were 
beginning to mount.  Just as private savings had decreased considerably in the latter half 
of 1989, by 1992, public savings too had been reduced as a result of the relaxing of 
capital controls.130  This, paired with the rise in real appreciation in the exchange rate, 
keyed several individuals in prominent positions to being asking questions.131  The 
World Bank released a public document that stated, “Opening its [Mexico] current 
account also exposes Mexico to the volatility of short term capital movements that can 
transmit destabilizing external shocks to the economy even if the policies are right.”132  
To adjust for this issue, they recommended the increasing of interest rates and possibly 
depreciating the peso.133  To calm fears, the Mexican government indicated that the fiscal 
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accounts were still running a surplus and that the inflows of capital were largely private.  
Additionally, flexible exchange rates (within the band of allowable movement as 
stipulated in Pacto) allowed the economy enough leeway to adjust to international 
economic events without placing the overall economic health of the country in danger.  If 
this was still not enough reassurance to calm investors’ fears, Mexico was about to 
increase exports as well as productivity due to the upcoming signing of NAFTA.  When 
investors viewed all the available evidence, combined with the constant reassurance of 
IGOs and the U.S. government, they continued to invest in Mexico in record numbers.134   
Even though investors’ fears had been addressed, the real exchange rate was still 
increasing; some would argue at an unsustainable rate.  The rebuttal to this argument was 
based on sound economic principles.  The increase in the real exchange rate was based on 
achieving equilibrium as a consequence of the liberalization reforms that had taken place 
in Mexico through the 1980s and early 1990s.135  The problem with this theory, is that 
Mexico was experiencing capital inflows of upward of 7% of GDP…a level that cannot 
be sustained in the long run.  In the short or medium time frame, interest rate 
differentials, the perceived degrees of country and exchange rate risk, and the openness 
of an economy will allow increased debt or negative current account deficits to be held in 
the public market.  However, when viewed in the long run, these temporary measure lose 
their effectiveness and when combined with the pegged exchange rate system that Pacto 
implemented, when adjustments need to be made, based on increased capital inflows and 
the resultant current account deficit, it is unable to be accomplished.136  Unfortunately, 
this is exactly what happened in Mexico.   
When the new year dawned in 1994, economic indicators were still looking 
exceptionally sound, and investors continued to put considerable confidence and capital 
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into the Mexican economy.  The good luck of the Mexican economy however, would not 
hold for much longer. Several political and international events occurred in the early 
months of 1994 that changed the economic climate in Mexico.  These events would have 
an effect on how the Mexican government and the Banco de México choose to handle 
their deteriorating financial system.  
First, because of sustained economic performance in the U.S., the Fed decided to 
raise the federal funds rate.  This resulted in capital flight back to the U.S. to take 
advantage of increase yields offered in U.S. markets.137  Second, on January 1st, 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation, a revolutionary leftist group, declared war on 
Mexico.138  The rebellion grabbed international headlines throughout the world and it 
showed that even though Mexico has been on an impressive road to economic recovery, 
there is still much work to be done.139  Just a month later the Financial Times ran an 
article that pointed out several income distribution issues.  Third, on March 23rd, Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential candidate, was assassinated.140   
These three major events had far reaching consequences.   First, the exchange rate 
for the peso moved to the upper limit of the band.141  Second, a financial panic ensured 
and the demand for Mexican securities, or Mexican debt, took a sharp decline.142  After 
consulting with their NAFTA partners, Mexico decided that this event was a short term, 
non–reoccurring issue; to deal with their problems, Mexico raised the domestic interest 
rate, issued more dollar denominated securities (tesobones), and allowed the U.S. to 
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invest $10 billion to assist Mexico in stabilizing the peso.143  In the same month, the 28 
day cetes (peso–denominated government securities) interest rates increased from 10% to 
16%.  The U.S. Federal Reserve extended an additional $6 billion dollar swap line of 
credit to further stabilize the situation, however, it was never called into use.144 
Even though both of these events did have minor implications on the interest rate 
and the exchange rate, the international community, for the most part, didn’t seem to pay 
much attention.  Even though the investors had access to the tri–yearly announcement of 
the current account deficit (which by September 1994 was just shy of $20 billion dollars), 
capital was still flowing into the economy at very high rates.  The fact that capital was 
still flowing into the economy at high rates was not as troubling as how it was being 
invested.   
Just like the beginning of the 1983 LDC debt crisis, Mexico was experiencing 
issues paying their peso dominated debt.145  To temporally fix the problem, the Mexican 
government decided to impose an interest rate cap on all cetes and issue increased 
tesobonos.146  In December of 1993, 76.5% of Mexican debt was held in cetes and 
tesobones only accounted for 4.8%.  By December 1994, that rate was almost completely 
reversed; cetes accounted for only 14.2% of Mexican debt, and tesobones held 80.6%.147  
Additionally, the government made the decision to maintain the money supply target (the 
total amount of money available in an economy at a specific time).148  This meant that 
when the Mexican government decided to decrease the reserves to pay their external debt, 
                                                 
143 Edwards, “Bad Luck of Bad Policies?,” 111; Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 158. 
144 Edwards, “Bad Luck of Bad Policies?,” 111; Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 159. 
145 Whitt, “The Mexican Peso Crisis,” 2. 
146 Edwards, “Bad Luck of Bad Policies?,” 112. 
147 Lustig, Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 160; Whitt, “The Mexican Peso Crisis,” 11. 
148 Johnson, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms,” Department of Political Science, Auburn 
University, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/money_stock (accessed on 03 March, 2012); Lustig, 
Mexico:  The Remaking of an Economy, 160. 
 37 
as is prudent given the $20 billion deficit in their current account, due to sluggish export 
performance in the traditional sectors of the economy, they had to increase credit. 
By mid-1994, there was no hiding the fact that the peso was overvalued.  The 
Brookings Institution economic panel would argue by upwards of 30%.149  The Pacto 
fixed / pegged exchange rate system, in conjunction with the absolute instance in 
maintaining single digit inflation rates was unsustainable in the long run.  In May 1994, a 
memo from the Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs pointed out that the 
Mexican government has spent $10 Billion dollars in defending the peso since the 
assassination of Colosio.150   
In August of 1994, the new PRI candidate was elected president and in 
September, Pacto was renewed for another year.151  When the new administration took 
office, the major aspects of the economic policy were left untouched.  This decision was 
at least partially based on the hopes that capital inflows would return to the 1990–1993 
rates and that any change in the exchange rate of the peso would adversely affect that 
extremely vulnerable national banking sector.152   
By October, due to the number of U.S. dollar linked securities and bonds that the 
Mexican government was issuing, the M3 monetary aggregate (or the traditional assets 
plus long term deposits) was increasing at an annual rate of over 20%.153  Couple this 
with the increase in dollar denominated debt previously discussed, and Mexico was 
primed for a financial crisis.  To make matters worse, Telmex posted disappointing third 
quarter earnings, caused by the entrance of AT&T into the Mexican market.  This action 
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resulted in the decline of the internal reserves of over $5 billion dollars.154  In late 
October, Mexico grated 52 operating licenses to foreign banks to bolster the ever 
weakening economy.  However, by this point, the damage to the economy had reached a 
tipping point and these efforts proved fruitless.  By the end of November, the reserves in 
Mexico were valued at $12.5 billion dollars, however short term public debt, 70% of 
which was tesobonos debt, was valued at $27 billion dollars.155 
In December, following months of continual declining reserves, the international 
community decided that holding Mexican debt was not a prudent decision;  a massive 
withdrawal of funds took place.  On December 20th, the exchange rate band attached to 
the peso was widened, allowing for a 15% devaluation of the Peso.156  On the same day, 
investors pulled an amazing $4 billion dollars out of Mexican economy, leaving the 
reserves with an inadequate $6 billion dollars to pay their foreign lenders.157   
C. CONCLUSION 
The 1983 LDC debt crisis was clearly the result of the fundamentally flawed ISI 
policies that were in place for the better part of four decades.  The reform measures that 
were introduced were clearly instrumental in the recovery of Mexico’s economy; yet at 
the same time, some of the reforms actually led to the onset of the 1994 Peso crisis.  Even 
though GDP recovered to its pre–crises numbers by 1997, the policy changes that were 
implemented following both crises have had lasting effects.158  Chapter III will evaluate 
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the role of ISI in the onset of the 1983 LDC debt crisis, and the economic reforms that 
were implemented following both crises. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the 1982 LDC debt crisis, the government slowly started to 
implement structural reforms.  During the first period of the debt crisis (1982–1985), the 
reforms were less than effective, and any positive results that structural changes produced 
were greatly reduced, or completely negated by other minor crises.  During the 
subsequent phases, due to the Baker Plan and Pacto, major structural reforms occurred.  
This chapter is subdivided into two main sections:   the first deals with the reforms 
resulting from the 1983 LDC debt crisis and the second focuses on the reforms resulting 
from the 1994 peso crisis.  Prior to evaluating these reforms, ISI will be examined, 
focusing specifically on how its policies helped steer the reform packages that were 
recommended from the IMF and U.S. government.  Following this examination, the five 
major economic reforms will be examined.  Each economic reform will be evaluated by 
first looking at problems that Mexico was facing, the theory that supported the reforms, 
and the actual reform that was implemented. 
B. STRUCTURAL REFORMS FOLLOWING THE 1983 LDC DEBT CRISIS 
The reforms that Mexico enacted following the 1983 LDC debt crisis can be 
grouped into two general categories:  economic reforms and social/political reforms.  
Economic reforms included: 
• an increase in free trade, otherwise known as trade liberalization 
• an increase in the commitment and effectiveness of the Mexican government to 
combat monopoly power 
• the controlling of inflation through the use of Pacto 
• structural changes throughout the tax system 
The political reforms included: 
 42 
• increases in the performance of the judicial system 
• an increase in the institutional safeguards in order to guarantee fiscal discipline 
and increase in local government empowerment 
• an increase in competitive federalism 
• a reduction in the initiation costs of firms broadly known as a more regulatory 
environment 
• an increase in the distribution of public educational expenditures as well as their 
accountability 
This chapter will only be evaluating the economic reforms and their impact on 
Mexico’s economic growth.  All of these reforms were designed to move Mexico away 
from ISI, Mexico’s economic system at the time of the collapse, towards a free market 
oriented system.  Prior to delving into the individual reforms, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at ISI. 
C. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION 
ISI is a development strategy that promotes barriers to trade in order to promote 
internal growth.159  Instead of relying on the highly unstable external markets 
(specifically oil and other commodity markets), Mexico could use the fundamentals of 
ISI (high trade barriers) to promote internal growth.  “The goal was to create industries 
capable of producing substitutes for expensive imports while simultaneously promoting 
industrial growth and the expansion of internal economies.”160  Mexico would produce 
key products that are expensive to import (usually this is advanced industrial/consumer 
products such as automobiles, refrigerators, etc…) while at the same time, allowing a safe 
                                                 
159 Franko, The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development, 52;  Baer, “Import Substitution and 
Industrialization in Latin America, 95. 
160 Franko, The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development, 56. 
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and protected sector for Mexico’s infant industry to grow.161  The theory was that ISI 
would induce a process of learning, driven by exposure to new ideas and processes that 
would dynamically spill over into the whole economy.162  Once this process of learning 
occurred, and the infant industry developed to a point where it could support itself in the 
competitive market, each sector of the economy would be individually reintroduced into 
the competitive free market system.  During the post–World War II era, this policy was 
endorsed by several key financial institutions such as the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (known as either ECLA or CEPAL for its Spanish 
acronym) in hopes that it would promote long term growth in the same ways that their 
counterparts in the United States and Europe were experiencing.163 
The ISI theory was based on a string of casual logic that can be traced back to 
dependency theory.  According to dependency theory, countries did not succeed or fail 
because of internal national endowments, but because of a countries’ ability or inability 
to set the rules of the international economic game.164  In the real world, this meant that 
large, industrialized countries defined the rules and small, less developed countries were 
merely pawns in the international economic game for power and profit.  In short, rich 
countries became richer by making poor countries even poorer.165  Dependency theorist 
such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto believed that the peripheral 
countries could overcome their current imbalance in the international economic game, but 
only through active state involvement.166 
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At this point in the story, ECLA enters the picture under the ever guiding hand of 
structuralist Raúl Prebisch.  Prebish and his small group of structural economists focused 
on three interesting observations:  first, they noticed that the industrialized countries 
controlled the technology and that the distribution of that technology was slow.  Second, 
they were interested in the apparent correlation between interruptions in trade and growth 
during the WWII.  Finally, they observed that most Latin American economies relied 
heavily on commodity exports that had wide price fluctuations, such as oil or certain ore 
extracts.167  Based on these three assumptions, Prebish and his team determined that first, 
because less developed countries export agricultural products and trade them for 
technologically advanced products, they ended up facing declining terms of trade.  Due to 
these declining terms of trade, developing countries needed to export more and more of 
their primary products, such as agricultural products and oil, to keep up with developed 
countries.  Second, they arrived at the conclusion that international economics does not 
follow the preconceived rules that neo classical economists have assumed for centuries.  
In contrast to the neo classical approach, Prebish believed that economics is driven by 
politics.  Because politics drives economics, less developed countries tend to be a hand 
full of oligopolies and conglomerates. This leads to a movement away from the natural 
equilibrium of supply and demand and produces greater tension in the system.  
Furthermore, this tension leads to inequality in the international economic system.168  
The assumptions drawn from both of these theories, led most of the governments in the 
developing world to implement ISI as their basis for their economic growth.169 
ISI employs several mechanisms or policies to help achieve growth.  In Mexico, 
the tools took the role of the following policies:  active industrial policy, high tariff walls 
(otherwise known as protectionism), targeted lending to key sectors, multinational 
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activity (loans from outside the country) and, a passive or loose monetary policy.170  In 
Mexico, ISI did produce growth.  In fact, the growth throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s 
was unprecedented in Latin America or in any developing country the size of Mexico.  
Unfortunately, the growth that was produced was unsustainable.  This was the result of 
the exact monetary policies that allowed it to grow earlier in the century.  In order to 
ensure that certain key industries were growing, target lending was introduced.  As 
economic inefficiencies became apparent (as is always the case for ISI economies in the 
long run), the government lent greater and greater amounts of money to floundering 
industries.  Not only were large sums of money being handed out at will, but the 
industries that were being developed were not able to compete in the free market.  
Eventually, because of the high trade barriers, the inefficient industries, and the large 
foreign debt that had been accrued due to massive government lending programs, the 
Mexican economy collapsed under its own weight.  Had these policies not been in place 
(in other words, if Mexico had not adopted ISI) then the crisis would never have 
occurred. 
This dependency on ISI is why the United States Secretary of the Treasury, James 
A. Baker III insisted that the situation in Mexico would not improve until structural 
reforms occurred. 
D. TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
Under ISI, Mexico’s economy was operating under a protectionist frame work.  
ISI works because it closes off the economy to the international free market economy to 
help the infant industry grow.  In order to produce lasting growth, the Mexican 
government needed to open up their economy to the rest of the world; this action is called 
trade liberalization. This section will evaluate the two major policy changes that Mexico 
implemented in an effort to liberalize their economy:  reduced barriers into the national 
economy and international trade agreements.  The evaluation will consist of an in–depth 
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look into the theory of tariffs and other trade barriers, followed by Mexico’s attempt to 
liberalize their economy through the implementation of free trade agreements and 
reductions in tariffs.171 
1. Tariffs and Barriers to Trade 
Tariffs have been used by countries for various reasons for centuries.  As stated 
previously, Mexico used tariffs and other barriers to bar entry into the domestic economy 
to help certain key industries grow.  The economic principle of tariffs are simple; by 
implementing tariffs, producers can either expand their own production and sales, raise 
the price they charge, or any combination of the two.172  As stated in Chapter II, due to 
the implementation of ISI in Mexico, their economy was relatively closed by 
international standards.  However, during the López–Portillo administration, due to the 
ever widening current account deficit, several governmental actors were beginning to 
question if this was the correct stance.  President López–Portillo, being a former finance 
minister for Mexico, understood what needed to happen, and he attempted to start the 
liberalization process.  His moderate approach included swapping some import licenses 
with tariffs, gradually removing some Official Reference Prices (ORP), and the 
establishment of fiscal and trade credits.  This was designed to reduce anti–export basis 
and increase industrial efficiency.173  However, with increased revenue flowing into 
Mexico due to the discovery of increased oil reserves, none of these liberalization 
measures produced much actual change.  Regardless of the method used to promote 
growth, protection levels increased substantially as the level of manufacturing increased.  
This pattern is most notably in the consumer durables sector and capital goods sector 
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(effective protection rates averaged 77% throughout the 1970s).174  This trend increased 
until the announcement in August 1983, that Mexico had become insolvent.   
2. Mexico’s Attempt to Rectify the Problem 
The IMF, World Bank, and other international economic entities recommended 
that Mexico reduce their tariffs, thereby allowing their industry to compete naturally in 
the world wide free market economy.  This proved to be a daunting process for Mexico.  
In July 1985, the Mexican government reluctantly agreed with the afore mentioned 
institutions and shifted away from ISI towards an export led economic growth model.  
Between July 1985 and December 1987, Mexico implemented a unilateral trade 
liberalization program.175  The program consisted of three major structural changes:  the 
first was accomplished through an import liberalization program.176  The import 
liberalization program consisted of a substantial reduction in imports that were protected 
using permits (the main barrier to trade liberalization in Mexico).  A reduction of 35%–
45% was mandated for immediate removal, with additional cuts in the months 
following.177  In addition, Import Licensing Requirements (ILR) were eliminated on 
3600 tariffed items, thereby increasing non licensed imports from 16.4% in December 
1984 to 64.1% in December 1985.178  By using Import Permit Protection (IPP is merely 
tariffs or entry barriers), the Mexican government was providing substantial protection to 
local producers.  When the government made the decision to reduce IPP, they were 
essentially removing an extremely large tariff, or barrier, to the world market.   Second, 
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ORP were phased out.179  An ORP is the pricing of a product just below its main 
competitor.180  When Mexico removed the ORP, it had once again reduced another 
measure designed to ensure that consumers were purchasing domestic products as 
opposed to imports.  Finally, the top tariff rate was slashed from 100% to 20%.181  (The 
results of these processes can be seen in the Table 1).  It is important to note that this 
liberalization occurred only in the manufacturing sector.  Only later did the Mexican 
government liberalize its service sector followed by agriculture.   Even though they were 
not liberalized in the initial wave, ISI had a much greater impact on manufactured goods 
as compared to services and agriculture products. 
 
Table 1.   Results of Trade Liberalization Efforts in Mexico (From Cronin, “Expanding Free 
Trade,” 77) 
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3. Trade Agreements 
The second half of the liberalization puzzle consisted of trade agreements.  As 
Mexico was implementing their policy adjustments to reduce their dependence on ISI, 
they were simultaneously making preparations to join several free trade organizations.  
When the announcement came on 25 November 1985, that Mexico would join the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it was hailed as a turning point in their 
LDC debt crisis, however, several roadblocks still needed to be removed.182  By July 
1986, Mexico was in compliance with all entry requirements and was formally admitted.  
Since their entrance in GATT, Mexico has joined Canada and the United States as part of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as signing eleven 
additional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) that encompasses forty one different nations.183  
This continued liberalization has shown the international community as well as IGO that 
its commitment to economic liberalization is not a fleeting ideal. 
E. COMBAT OF MONOPOLY POWER 
During the years that Mexico was under an ISI system, the government assisted in 
the sustainment of several preexisting monopolies as well as creating several new ones.  
This list is quite amazing and encompasses all sectors of the economy.  Several of the 
monopolies that have been around the longest are constitutionally mandated.  In 1938, 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) was monopolized under Article 27 of the constitution of 
1917.184  Not only did article 27 give the Mexican government a permanent and 
inalienable right to oil, but it also nationalized all subsoil resources.185  This was 
however, not the first nationalization of a business in Mexico.  That distinction belongs to 
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the railroads which were nationalized in 1929 and 1930.186  This section will look at the 
monopolies that were present when the 1983 LDC debt crisis occurred and will determine 
what role they played in the crisis.  To conclude, an overview of Mexico’s attempt to 
control the monopolies will be conducted.  For information regarding the theoretical 
support for removing monopolies from the economy, see the technical appendix. 
1. Monopolies: A Problem for Mexico 
Pemex and the railroad industry were not the only nationalized businesses that 
Mexico had in place when the economy took a turn for the worse.  Almost any major 
service, to include oil, natural gas, electricity, the rail roads, telephones and television 
providers, the airlines, construction, food production, and even land were state owned.187   
In addition to the massive numbers of state run enterprises that already existed, in the 
middle of negotiations with the IMF for additional funding during September of 1982, 58 
of the 60 banks that were licensed to operate in Mexico were nationalized.188  These 
monopolies created considerable stress on the economy and hampered the recovery 
efforts following the 1983 LDC debt crisis. 
When monopolies are introduced into an economy, they not only create 
inefficiencies and net social losses (see technical appendix), but they also “undermine the 
Mexican economy’s capacity for both innovation and adaptation.”189  With so many key 
industries operating as inefficiently as they were (prior to 1993 when the privatization 
program ended, the median net income to sales for Mexican publically owned enterprises 
was –12.97%), it is no wonder why the Mexican economy needed as much outside capital 
as possible in order maintain solvency.190  A good example of this is the automotive 
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industry in Mexico.  The automotive decree of 1962, was designed to develop a robust 
automotive industry in Mexico through a ban on imported vehicles, a 60% value added 
tax, and a 40% limit on foreign ownership of auto parts manufacturing plants.191  The 
results of these taxes did increase production and employment, however, the long run 
consequences far outweighed the benefits.  After the automotive industry in Mexico was 
liberalized following the 1983 LDC debt crisis, it was soon discovered that because the 
industry was isolated from the competitive auto market, the domestically produced cars 
were of substandard quality and were prohibitively expensive by international 
standards.192  This required a massive infusion of foreign capital into the northern states 
of Mexico to regain competitiveness.  Even after this occurred, domestically produced 
cars were still not reaching their export goals.  On the other hand, the auto parts 
manufacturing plants in the north were showing considerable capital gains.193  This 
imbalance is a direct result of a lack of R&D and substandard quality resulting from the 
isolation of a closed economy.194  Without R&D, the industries that Mexico nationalized 
may have been able make it in the short run, but in the long run they were doomed to fail.   
This story is repeated in almost every sector of the Mexican economy.  Due to a 
lack of technological innovation, once liberalization occurred, the companies required 
massive inflows of foreign capital to regain competitiveness.  Without R&D, the 
technologically focused industries such as telecommunications, the airline industry, oil 
and other key service industries, were left behind by their more technologically advanced 
counterparts in the international free market. 
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2. The Breakup of the Monopolies in Mexico 
By 1982, the Mexican state controlled over 1,100 businesses in almost all sectors 
of the economy.195  When the economy collapsed in December of 1983, State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) accounted for “4.4 percent of the country’s labor force and 30 percent 
of fixed capital formation, and they received subsidies equivalent to almost 13 percent of 
GDP” and “produced 14% of national output, employed 4.4% of the labor force and 
accounted for 38% of fixed capital investment.”196  The privatization program was 
responsible for reducing the number of SOE, thereby reducing government expenditures.  
From 1982 to 1988, the Privatization Program reduced the number of SOE from the 
maximum of 1,155 to 666.  This was accomplished through liquidations, shutdowns, 
mergers, transfers, and privatizations.197  In addition to reducing the number of SOE in 
Mexico, changes to the constitution were ratified that reduced the role of the government.  
By 1993, the number of SOE had been reduced to 258, and by 2003, it was down to 
210.198  During the 1988–1993 period, most of the reduction of SOE was accomplished 
through selling of inefficient businesses as opposed to the methods discussed earlier.199  
The government did establish strict rules for the privatization of firms.  One the most 
important rules was the decision to sell off 100% of its ownership, instead of dividing up 
the interests between the government and the private sector.200  The results of this style 
of privatization will be examined in Chapter IV. 
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F. CONTROLING INFLATION 
Mexico throughout the 1980s was plagued by high inflation.  On two occasions 
(in 1983, the annual inflation rate based on the consumer price index (CPI) was 102% 
and in 1987 it was 132%), the inflation rate proved to be such an issue that unless 
addressed, it could single handily stop all economic progress.201  This inflation situation 
in Mexico was unsustainable, and therefore had to be addressed.  This section will focus 
on Mexico’s attempt to address the high inflation rates through the implementation of 
Pacto. 
1. Reason for the Implementation of the Economic Solidarity Pact 
(Pacto de Solidaridad Economica) 
In 1986, it was recognized that in order for the Mexican economy to have any 
chance at an economy recover, the lack of long term growth would need to be 
addressed.202  To achieve long term growth, a plan was worked out between the IMF and 
the Mexican government.  Most of the intricacies of the program are not important for the 
purpose of this chapter, however, one amendment to the 1987 stand–by arrangement was; 
it was decided that if the annual inflation rate rose above 85%, a new round of negations 
would commence, aimed at relieving inflationary pressure.203  Even with this 
contingency built into the 1987 stand–by arrangement, following “Black Monday” 
(October 19th, 1987), it became clear that authorities would need to intervene to limit the 
effects of the ever worsening world financial crisis on the Mexican economic system.  
This intervention took the form of a heterodox regime called the Economic Solidarity 
Pact, or Pacto. 
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2. Implementation of the Economic Solidarity Pact (Pacto de 
Solidaridad Economica) 
Pacto was a non–traditional, multi–pronged strategy to induce inflation 
stabilization in Mexico.  Pacto had several components designed to achieve four main 
goals:  restore and maintain international competitiveness, strengthen fiscal balance, 
liberalize trade policy, and maintain social consensus on wage policy.  To accomplish the 
first goal, the controlled exchange rate was devalued by 18%.  This was designed to 
eliminate the difference between the controlled and free exchange rates.  The second goal 
was to be accomplished through a “combination of expenditure cuts and higher prices for 
energy products, utilities, ect.”204  Pacto accelerated the trade liberalization program 
previously discussed through reduction and elimination of tariffs and trade barriers.  
Finally, periodic agreements were reached between labor unions, key private business 
leaders, and the government that were based on projected inflation.205  Together, these 
four goals would reduce, and then maintain a stable inflation rate.206   
There are numerous ways to reduce inflation.  Some of the most widely used 
government policies include:  monetary policy, fiscal policy, income policies, and long 
term solutions such as supply side reforms.207  Elements of each of these policies were 
used in Mexico following the 1983 LDC debt crisis. 
Monetary policy is defined as “The actions of a central bank, currency board or 
other regulatory committee that determine the size and rate of growth of the money 
supply, which in turn affects interest rates. Monetary policy is maintained through actions 
such as increasing the interest rate, or changing the amount of money banks need to keep 
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in the vault (bank reserves).”208  These policies are designed to reduce the aggregate 
demand by reducing consumer spending and increasing incentives to save.209  Aggregate 
demand is “the total amount of goods and services demanded in the economy at a given 
overall price level and in a given time period.”210 
Fiscal policy is defined as “government spending policies that influence 
macroeconomic conditions. These policies affect tax rates, interest rates and government 
spending, in an effort to control the economy.”211  By implementing fiscal policies, a 
government can reduce demand pull inflation, thereby, reducing aggregate demand. 
Both of these two policies can be easily understood when viewed in graphical 
form.  Graph 5 shows the effects of a reduction in aggregate demand.  Start by plotting 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand.  Aggregate supply is “the total supply of goods 
and services produced within an economy at a given overall price level in a given time 
period.”212  Where aggregate supply and aggregate demand intersect represents the 
equilibrium price (PL1) and the corresponding level of GDP (Q1).  By shifting aggregate 
demand down (regardless of the method used), the equilibrium shifts from point A to 
point B, causing a reduction in the price level from PL1 to PL2, and a reduction in GDP 
from Q1 to Q2. 
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Figure 1.   Inflation Reduction Measures 
Income policy is defined as “measures through which a government attempts to 
control escalation in incomes (wages, salaries, dividends, rents) to restrain escalation in 
prices (inflation) without increasing unemployment.”213  This is usually implemented 
through wage controls.  Just as in monetary and fiscal policies, the idea centers around 
reducing the amount of money consumers have at their disposal.  By reducing money 
supply, consumers will spend less and save more, once again, reducing aggregate 
demand.  Even though these are the three main methods used by governments to control 
inflation, there are some long term policies that have also produced results. 
Supply side inflationary policies are aimed at increasing the productive capacity 
of the economy.  By reducing the cost per unit, a company (and national economy) can 
increase income without increasing inflationary pressure.  This is the result of increasing 
                                                 
213 “incomes policy,” Business Dictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/incomes-
policy.html (accessed on 02 April, 2012). 
 57 
labor and capital productivity.214  The reason for the long time frame of these policies is 
the means used to achieve the overall goal.  Increasing labor and capital productivity 
requires investments in education and health care (and other long run variables) which 
will require generations, not months to successfully decrease inflationary pressure.  
Graph 6 shows how increasing productivity (regardless of the means used to 
accomplish the increase) will shift the aggregate supply curve outward.  Just as before, 
start by plotting aggregate supply and aggregate demand (aggregate supply 1 and 
aggregate demand 1 respectively).  By shifting the aggregate supply curve outward 
(represented by aggregate supply 2), the equilibrium is shifted from point A to point B.  
The outward shift in the aggregate supply curve is accompanied by an outward shift in 
the aggregate demand curve (aggregate demand 2), which allows the price level to remain 
relatively unaffected while still increasing the GDP. 
 
Figure 2.   Supply Side Inflation Reduction Measures 
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G. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE TAX SYSTEM 
In 2007, the World Bank released a scathing report documenting Mexico’s 
economic problems.  According to the World Bank the tax code in Mexico is far too 
complex to be enforced by the government.  This is a contributing factor that has led to 
Mexico’s biggest tax problem; tax evasion.  In Mexico, there is an estimated 40% of the 
population that don’t pay their taxes.215  To get to the bottom of this issue, this section 
will address the problems that have plagued Mexico’s tax system, past tax reforms that 
attempted to correct the issue, and the reforms that took place following the 1983 LDC 
debt crisis, and the results of said reforms. 
1. The Problem in Mexico 
The Mexican government continues to be unable to raise the required level of 
revenue to cover their expenditures or expenses.216  Tax revenues as a percentage of 
GDP from 1980–1999, has remained relatively stable (between 9.03% and 11.53%), yet 
government expenditures and the population have continued to rise.217   This broken 
system is the result of a few main issues: ineffective administration, the informal 
economy, and tax evasion.  In the past, several tax revisions have been attempted to try to 
increase the amount of tax revenue flowing into the Mexican government, but ultimately 
failed. 
Prior to adopting ISI, there was a general feeling that the old economic system 
was partly responsible for the inequities in income distribution that were present in 
Mexico during the late 1960s and 1970s.  To adjust for this income disparity, several tax 
and income laws were changed (or at least were attempted to be changed).218  Some of 
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the changes were successful, however, the laws and reforms that were implemented 
resulted in little actual change to the nature or structure of the tax system.219  This 
problem was only exacerbated when Mexico’s ISI system collapsed.  When President 
Salinas came into power, there was a realization that in order to overcome the current 
LDC debt crisis, foreign investors needed to be persuaded to reinvest in the Mexican 
economy.  “Foreign investors not only sought markets that were adopting new 
technologies and innovative market strategies, but they also demanded a competitive tax 
system and favorable regulatory environment.”220   
One of the main reasons why Mexico was unable to collect the necessary revenue 
that is required to effectively run the state, is the ineffective administration of the tax 
code.  Mexico is marred by inefficiencies throughout the state and the tax system is no 
different.  The tax code of the 1980s and early 1990s was, and continues to be, a very 
complex system.  There were multiple tax rates that each company had to comply with, 
and exemptions and loopholes allowed for considerable “wiggle room” within the tax 
code.  What made matters worse was the inability of Servicio de Administracion 
Tributaria (SAT) to conduct audits.221  SAT did not have the requisite knowledge or 
ability to conduct audits due to the complex tax code.  This means that the very large and 
lucrative firms that are responsible for the majority of corporate tax revenue, are in 
essence, paying a voluntary tax.  Due to the inability of SAT to effectively audit the 
firms, the Mexican government is relying on the “honor system” to ensure that firms are 
paying the correct amount of taxes.222  Even with these problems, the tax code continued 
to change at an alarming pace.  Due to the frequency of changes, it is clearly not SATs 
fault alone that they are unable to effectively administer the laws and tax code.223 
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Another serious problem was the ability of tax payers to avoid paying taxes 
altogether.224  During the early 1980s, Mexico had lost almost all ability to effectively 
collect taxes; in 1989, tax evasion was estimated to be 70%.225  This was the result of the 
complex tax codes and laws (as previously discussed), as well as the very large informal 
economy.  17% of Mexican citizens qualified for either the minor tax payers (MTP) 
exemption or the special tax basis (STB), which allowed them to reduce their payments 
to the government or forgo tax payments completely.226  Additionally, according to 
research conducted by the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), “the Mexican 
informal sector at the beginning of the 1970s initially accounted for 40 percent of GDP 
while slightly decreasing to stabilize around 30percent of GDP in the late 1980s.”227  
Had the SAT been able to effectively collect taxes on this large informal sector, tax 
revenue would have increased considerably. 
2. The Solution 
To ensure that foreign investors would return to Mexico following the 1983 LDC 
debt crisis, President Salinas implemented several changes to the tax code / law.  From 
1979–1994, Mexico attempted eleven major changes to the tax code / law.228  Due to the 
large number of attempted revisions to the tax code/laws, this section will not go into 
great detail in all of the changes.  However, it will highlight a few of the major changes 
that were implemented in the 1988/1989 tax reform under President Salinas, and show 
why they were of great importance in changing the nature of the tax system in Mexico. 
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In 1988, President Salinas introduced a law in Congress that recommended major 
changes to the current tax code.  A tough battle raged in congress due to interest group 
lobbying, however, in 1989 the bill was approved and signed into law.  The main changes 
that the 1988 tax reform law addressed was:  the introduction of a 2% asset tax on 
businesses, the elimination of the special provisions for minor tax payers (MTP) and the 
special tax basis (STB), the penalties for tax evasion were increased, loopholes were 
closed, and enforcement mechanisms were improved.229 
The introduction of a 2% asset tax seems like a small inclusion, however, the 
entire reason for inclusion of a 2% asset tax was to simplify the tax code, thereby 
reducing the level of manipulation in system.230  By simplifying the tax code, the 
government was attempting to reduce the amount of tax evasion, which was estimated to 
be 70% in 1989.231  What made the new law so effective was its simplicity.  All firms 
have to pay the tax, and the entire amount can be credited towards the payment of income 
tax.  This ensured that the only firms that would be affected were those who found a way 
to declare no profits, or those firms that paid no taxes at all.232  What made this new tax 
so hard to effectively combat by the business community was the coupling of reduced tax 
rates in other sectors.  “The top personal rate went down from 60.5% (including a 5.5% 
surcharge for the earthquake of 1985) in 1986 to 55% in 1987; 50% in 1988; and to 40% 
in 1989. Starting in 1990 the top rate fell even further to 35%.  The corporate tax rate also 
went down, from 39% in 1988 to 35% in 1990.”233  By reducing these tax rates, the 
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Mexican government was able to align their tax rates with the U.S., therefore, reducing 
the urge to evade taxes through capital flight.234   
The elimination of the special provisions for minor tax payers (MTP) and the 
special tax basis (STB) was also a key factor that produced considerable repercussions 
through the system.  Over 1.5 million individuals in Mexico were able to claim protection 
under MTPs and STBs.  By eliminating these two special provisions, the 17% of 
Mexicans who “legally paid no taxes, or had enjoyed special and privileged tax regimes” 
were forced to provide some revenue to the government.235   
The increased penalties for tax evasion, the closing of loopholes in the tax system, 
and the improved enforcement mechanisms can be grouped into a final category due to 
the interrelated nature of their changes.  Prior to the changes in the law that allowed for 
strengthening of the prosecution capacity for tax evaders, only two individuals were 
prosecuted (the time frame for that statistic spans 67 years).  Not only was the frequency 
of prosecution increased (by 1990, over 400 people had been prosecuted; an increase of 
over 13,000%), so was the severity of the crime.236  Prior to the change in the law, if you 
were caught committing fraud, or evading tax payments, 99% of the time you were only 
required to pay the government the back taxes owed in addition to a small fine.  Once the 
law was changed, depending on the severity of the evasion, you might also be required to 
serve time in jail.237  To accompany this increase in prosecution, auditing was also 
increased.  Without the ability to audit, an effective enforcement arm serves little 
purpose. 
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H. THE 1994 PESO CRISIS 
Within a year of the Peso devaluation that occurred in December 1994, real GDP 
declined by 6.2 percent and the inflation rate reached 46.9% by December 1995.  In 
February 1995, interest rates skyrocketed due to restrictive credit and monetary policies 
imposed by the Bank of Mexico.  The events that triggered the 1994 Peso crisis had 
placed the Mexican banking system on the verge of total collapse.238  This section will 
evaluate the causes of the 1994 banking crisis through an in–depth look at past banking 
issues and practices, the banking reform that assisted the economy in recovery, and the 
results of the reform measures. 
1. Events Leading up to the 1994 Banking Crisis 
The history of the Mexican banking sector is best viewed in two distinct sections:  
from 1983 until the reforms were implemented in 1988 and from the start of the banking 
reforms in 1988 through the onset of the 1994 banking crisis. As has already been 
reviewed, the 1983 LDC debt crisis is a direct result of the unsustainable rate of 
borrowing from the international community and Bank of Mexico.  In 1982, the Mexican 
government announced a plan to amend the constitution which would allow the 
nationalization 58 out of the 60 publically controlled banks.  Following the privatization 
of the banking sector, a subsequent consolidation was initiated; of the 58 banks that were 
privatized, only 18 remained by 1988.239  In addition to the removal of the banks from 
the public sector of the economy, a number of new rules were imposed upon the banks 
that would have lasting consequences.   
One of the most important changes was the limitations placed on banks that 
restricted the activities that they were allowed to conduct.  Under the new rules, banks 
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were prohibited from offering financial services beyond banking.  This led to a 
reinforcing cycle that resulted in the diminishing importance of banks in the financial 
community.240  In 1984, the government began to strip the non–banking activities away 
from the remaining banks under their control.241  This decision was designed to “allow 
private investors (often former bank owners) to form and operate stock brokerage firms, 
insurance and re–insurance firms, and currency exchange firms.”242  This was not the 
only new rule that would have unintended consequences for the banking sector and the 
national economy.  Some of the other new “rules” included, interest rate ceilings on bank 
deposits and loans, as well as mandated lending quotas on high priority economic sectors 
through the national development bank, Nacional Financiera (NF); usually the larger 
sectors of the economy received the lion’s share of the funding.243  The government 
controls reached all levels of bank operations.  Operational procedures such as 
employment rates, branch locations, and even the annual budget for income and expenses 
were controlled by government agencies.  These are small compared to the requirements 
that were placed on banks in terms of credit loan requirements.  The individual banks 
were only allowed to determine where 25% of their lending would be focused.  The 
remaining 75% was earmarked for “federal government or to targeted sectors of the 
economy.”244  These rules that were instituted in the first years of the 1983 LDC debt 
crisis would have a profound impact in the decisions of investors for the remainder of the 
banking crisis. 
When President Salinas took office in 1988, he implemented a series of programs 
designed to “reform the state.”  Included in these programs was a series of reforms to the 
now state controlled banking sector.  Thanks to the liberalization of the economy and the 
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reduction in the inflation rate due to Pacto, in 1989, the Mexican economy was granted 
reentry into the international capital markets.245  When this landmark event occurred, 
things for Mexico started to turn around.  In April 1989, interest rate controls and the 
self–imposed quotas on commercial lending were eliminated and relaxed respectively.  
By 1991, the reserve requirements on private debt were eliminated and the two year 
process of re–privatizing the banking sector began.246  By the end of 1992, the banking 
sector was back in the control of private citizens, however, the events that occurred in 
1989–1992, as a result of the unique market conditions that were present when re–
privatization occurred, would place the Mexican financial sector on a path towards 
collapse. 
At the time of the auction, the four largest banks in Mexico controlled 70% of the 
total banking assets.  Additionally, because foreign banks were not allowed to participate 
in the auction, there was a general belief amongst the participants that a state backed 
oligopoly would be created, allowing for higher profits.  This condition resulted in the 
new privately owned banks participating in risky lending practices.247  Furthermore, 
because of the structure of the new market, bank directors, depositors, and regulators 
were not encouraged to enforce prudent lending practices on the new banks.248  Even 
though there were some benefits of the 1988 banking reforms, there still existed an 
outdated regulatory environment and a lack of enforceable rules.249  Several regulatory 
agencies embodied these risky lending practices. 
The Bank Savings Protection Fund (FOBAPROA) was created in 1990 to ensure 
the solvency of the banking sector in Mexico.  One of the key functions of FOBAPROA 
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was to promote confidence in the banking sector through deposit insurance.  The Bank of 
Mexico, through FOBAPROA, guaranteed 100% deposit insurance regardless of the 
amount.  Even though this did promote investor confidence, it also caused a lack of 
oversight from depositors of large sums of money.250  Additionally, not a single 
regulatory body required any bank to adhere to the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).  The regulatory institutions were so lax, that Mexican banks were not 
required to report the entire value of past–due loans as nonperforming, just the past–due 
interest payments.251  It was not just the regulators and banks, but also the legal system 
was not structured to enforce the lending contracts that were increasingly classified as 
non–preforming.  Even though there were more and more non–preforming loans on the 
banks’ balance sheets, the self–perpetuating cycle was in full effect, further reinforcing 
the risky lending practices.252  This equated to banks’ lending to individuals and firms 
that were not in a financially stable position to be able to service their debt.  The event 
that caused the house of cards to come tumbling down was the December 1994 decision 
to devaluate the Peso that led to the 1994 Peso crisis. 
Now that the causes of the 1994 banking crisis have been identified (lack of an 
appropriate legal and regulatory environment reinforcing the risky lending practices, and 
the expansion of both bank credit and financial intermediation), an examination of the 
1988/1989 and 1994/1995 banking reforms can be conducted. 
2. 1988 Banking Reforms 
The 1988 banking reforms were disbursed over several years and culminated in 
the re–privatization of the banking sector.  In April 1989, controls on interest rates and 
the sectoral quotas imposed by the government on commercial lending were 
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eliminated.253  As previously mentioned, FOBAPROA was created in 1990 to increase 
the oversight requirements on the soon to be privatized banks, as well as increase 
consumer confidence in the banking sector.  Also in 1990, the government allowed for 
the creation of integrated financial groups.254  This meant that banks could now conduct 
operations other than strictly banking practices.  These included, but were not limited to 
financial planning, “leasing, factoring, currency exchange, mutual fund management, and 
asset–based warehousing firms.”255 To accompany this increased responsibility, new 
laws and updated regulatory frameworks were introduced to manage these new 
multifaceted organizations.  In 1991, reserve requirements on private deposits were 
eliminated and the auctions that re–privatized the banking sector began.256   
3. 1994 Banking Reforms 
Following the 1994 Peso crisis, a banking reform was initiated that ran through 
1998.  The package was designed and implemented by Banco de México (BOM), 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (the Mexican finance ministry, and Comisión 
Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (the national banking and securities commission).257  
The reforms consisted of many different types of programs and were implemented in two 
general phases:  the first was the initial rescue package that was designed to avert a total 
collapse of the banking sector, and the second was the long term reforms that were 
designed to avoid a repeat of this crisis.  The rescue package consisted of liquidity 
window programs, initial capitalization programs, loans for bonds swap programs, 
NAFTA and foreign banks led programs, and debt relief programs. 
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The liquidity window programs were designed to ensure the solvency of the 
current banks and ensure that they had the funds necessary to meet all immediate dollar 
denominated liabilities.  The program worked by offering the banks short term dollar 
denominated credit back by the central bank and FOBAPROA.  This credit carried short 
term maturity dates designed to provide the necessary incentives for the receiving banks 
to find alternatives funding sources.258 
The initial capitalization program was a much more complex program designed to 
assist banks in increasing their capital to asset ratio above 8%.  Due to the large amount 
of delinquent loans on the banks’ balance sheets, this became a very important short term 
goal.  The main tool to accomplish this 8% capital to asset ratio was the selling of 5–year 
convertible bonds to FOBAPROA.259  While FOBAPROA was acquiring a massive 
amount of debt, the banks were expected to independently increase the capital flows.  
This was achieved through, a “reinvestment of retained earnings,” capital injections from 
BBVA Bancomer (the largest investment bank in Mexico), and the reinvestment of 
revenue from “the divestiture of bank investments in insurance companies and pension 
funds.”260  This independent increase in capital would not have been possible a few 
months prior to the 1994 Peso crisis because of the severe restrictions placed on banks 
from the government.261 
Now that the banking system in Mexico was not on the verge of immediate 
collapse, the government shifted its attention towards long term stabilization (phase two).  
Loans for Bonds Swaps were managed under the Capitalization and Loan Portfolio 
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Purchase Program (CLPPP).262  The CLPPP was the government’s main effort to prevent 
a total collapse of the financial sector in Mexico.  Just as in the initial capitalization 
programs, FOBAPROA acquired a portion of the banks past due loans, as well as the 
rights to any assets that could be recovered.  This increase in liability on the part of 
FOBAPROA was not cheap.  The banks were required to:  1) purchase special 
FOBAPROA issued 10–year Unidad de Inversión (UDI) indexed, non–negotiable bonds, 
2) surrender their institutions to FORAPROA if the banking authorities were unable to 
convert their debt into equity, 3) if further capitalization efforts failed, liquidate or sell 
their institutions.263  In addition to these terms, all banks would also have to participate in 
initial capitalization programs.  The requirements were quite lax in this regard; only half 
of all peso denominated debt would have to be repaired to FORAPROA through initial 
capitalization programs.264  Anahuac, Capital, Cremi, Interestatal, Obrero, Oriente, 
Pronorte, and Union banks were all forced to hand over control of their financial 
institutions due to their inability to meet the above mentioned terms.  Immediately 
following the handover of control, all banking operations were ceased and the institutions 
were liquidated.265  Other banks fared better; under the Saneamiento Program, Serfin and 
Santander banks were allowed to merge and continue to operate under the ever watchful 
eye of the newly minted government regulatory institutions.266   
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Once the severity of the situation was realized, foreign owned banks were allowed 
to purchase a few of the failed Mexican banks.  This was the case for Santander bank, 
which was purchased by Bank of Nova Scotia.267  This was coordinated under the 
NAFTA and Foreign Banks led programs.  Initially, in order for a foreign owned bank to 
purchase a failed Mexican bank, the failed bank could account for no more than 6% of 
the total banking capital present in Mexico.  However, as time passed, new laws were 
introduced that increased the number of banks that could be purchased, as well as the 
percentage of Mexican banking capital that could be foreign owned.  By the end of the 
reform period, all but the three largest banks were foreign owned and each bank could 
now control up to 25% of Mexican banking capital.268 
Most of the programs that have been discussed up until this point were directed at 
large firms; however, the debt relief programs were specifically designed to target 
individual and small borrowers.  Features of the debt relief program included, decreased 
interest rates, payment discounts, and debt restructuring; all designed to help the small 
borrower not fall any further behind in his payments.269  Even though this program was 
targeted at the small borrowers, by stopping the small borrowers from defaulting, the 
large lenders would be able to decrease their non–preforming loan numbers and increase 
capital.  Once these measures were put into place, the Mexican government was 
confident that disaster had been averted; however, to ensure that this type of systematic 
collapse could not happen again, the long term structural problems had to be addressed. 
The first change designed to place Mexico on a sustainable path towards financial 
security was the introduction of new bank accounting standards and supervision 
practices.  The new practices were introduced in 1995 and approved by the banking 
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regulatory committee in 1997.270  The new rules required:  stricter standards to deal with 
related lending, the strengthening of the quality and increasing of the quantity of capital 
reserves on banks’ balance sheets, the elimination of unjust forbearance, improved loan 
classifications and provisioning rules, new means to assess and measure risk, 
consolidated balance sheets, and income statements for financial groups.271  These 
measures were all designed to impose “greater disclosure on banks and make their 
balance sheets more directly comparable with those in other countries, particularly with 
regard to the disclosure of nonperforming loans.”272  These reforms to the bank 
accounting standards and supervision practices would not be enforceable unless 
FOBAPROA was reformed as well; and that is exactly what the Mexican authorities set 
out to do. 
In 1998, FOBAPROA was not overhauled, but completely replaced by the 
Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings (IPAB).  The structure and function of IPAB 
was designed based on modern international deposits insurance institutions (such as the 
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC]).273  Specifically, two measures were 
considerably changed from those present under FOBAPROA; a reduction in the amount 
covered for 100% protection under deposit insurance, and “authority to formally 
intervene if it detects irregularities in a member bank.”274  These two changes were 
designed to correct one of the main issues leading to risky lending practices.  By 
decreasing protection and increasing intervention, large depositors paid closer attention to 
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the regulators and the inner workings of the bank where their funds are kept.  This 
decreased the banks’ ability and opportunity to partake in risky lending practices.275   
Because of the high number of outstanding or non–preforming loans, regulators 
set out to strengthen the legal framework in hopes of preventing another financial crisis.  
The old bankruptcy laws, Ley de Quiebras y Suspensión de Pagos (LQSP), was deemed 
ineffective and a hindrance in the new open market system that had been implemented 
following the 1983 LDC debt crisis. In 2000, congress passed the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles (LCM) bill which completely overhauled the fifty plus year old bankruptcy 
laws.276  The bill was designed to help lenders recover funds from citizens that had 
declared bankruptcy.  This was accomplished in two ways:  first, the claimants would 
attempt to settle outside of the courtroom.  By moving to from formal trials to alternate 
dispute resolutions (ADR) institutions, there was a better chance of increasing the 
number of resolved cases.  This reduced the caseload of the already overworked lawyers 
in Mexico and assisted in recovery of assets.  If the informal ADR was unsuccessful, then 
the second phase would begin, and an official trail would be started.277 
The last major systematic change that occurred in Mexico was the increased 
presence of foreign owned banks.  In 1994, of the 35 banks that were present in Mexico, 
only two were foreign owned and they only controlled 7% of the total banking assets.  
Ten years later, in 2004, that share of total banking assets controlled had increased to 
83%.278  The increase in foreign banking in Mexico was based on the theory that by 
increasing competitiveness within the system, the entire banking sector would be able to 
reduce costs and increase efficiency.  The same theory had been applied to the trade 
liberalization and market opening strategies that had been implemented less than 10 years 
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prior with astounding results.279  By increasing competitiveness within the system, total 
credit by commercial banks, as well as, private sector credits by banks both declined 
considerably.  This decrease in bank credits has been directly translated into consumer 
welfare gains.  In addition to the decrease in bank credit, one of the largest problems 
leading to the 1994 banking crisis was corrected; the number and percentage of non–
preforming loans has been reduced to a manageable level.280 
I. CONCLUSION 
The economic reforms that were implemented following the 1983 and 1994 
economic crises undoubtedly placed Mexico on a path towards economic growth.  The 
question of “How much growth?” is still widely debated today.  The next chapter will 
evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms and determine if, in fact, they did place the 
country on a path towards sustained development. 
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IV. RESULTS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With Mexico implementing the orthodox economic policies that were 
recommended by the IMF in both the late 1980s and early to mid–1990s, the international 
community was expecting a remarkable turnaround; however, this was not the case.  
Even though Mexico did implement the reforms that the IMF called for in their tranche 
agreements and in their dealings with the major holders of international debt, economic 
growth never reached the levels that were achieved during the “Mexican Miracle.”  This 
chapter will evaluate the results of the economic reforms that were discussed in Chapter 
III.   
B. RESULTS OF TRADE LIBERILIZATION 
As noted in Chapter III, Mexico’s trade liberalization program produced quite 
amazing results.  Tariffs were drastically reduced, IPP and ILR were removed or 
considerably scaled down, and ORP were completely abolished.  With this dramatic 
change in the structure of their economy, governmental leadership had placed Mexico on 
a path towards openness and competitiveness.  Following these reforms, the Mexican 
economy has been hailed as one of the most open economics in the developing world.281  
This is largely thanks to the globalization strategy that Mexico has pursued following the 
1983 LDC debt crisis and 1994 financial crisis.  This strategy has resulted in Mexico 
placing approximately “90% of its trade flows under trade agreements with over 40 
countries.”282  Even though this aggressive globalization strategy has largely aided 
Mexico’s financial recovery following both crises, there were still domestic causalities 
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along the way.  The relatively strait forward process of liberalization resulted in massive 
suffering for businesses that had been receiving protection from the barriers that were in 
place during the ISI period.  Often times, businesses filed for bankruptcy and were 
reorganized under a new owner, or they were sold off to the owners of the previously 
defaulted international debt. 
Given the massive economic liberalization that occurred in the Mexican economy, 
why did it not lead to economic growth?  One argument that is readily accepted 
throughout the field states that even though liberalization did occur, due to the 
substandard quality of Mexican industry and the resulting products, once the barriers and 
tariffs were removed, Mexican industry was not competitive in the global free market 
economy.283  Because Mexican firms were isolated from the major technological centers 
throughout the world (the industrialized countries such as the U.S. and Western Europe), 
technology transfers were not effectively or efficiently occurring, if at all.  Once trade 
barriers were removed, the key industries found that their products were not competitive 
with the rest of the world.  This led Mexico to continue to rely on the same exports (oil, 
commodities, and agriculture – in short, raw materials) that it had prior to the inward 
approach of ISI.284 
Even though Mexico’s economic growth has not returned to the “Mexican 
Miracle” levels that were present during the 1950s–1970s, trade liberalization should be 
considered a resounding success.  This success can be viewed in absolute terms by 
evaluating Mexico’s import and export composition and rate of growth following trade 
liberalization as compared to prior to the ISI period.  Prior to trade liberalization (1940–
1982), overall Mexican exports grew at an annual rate of 5.9%.  In the post reform period 
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(1980–2000), Mexican exports grew at an annual rate of 7.9%.285  This is largely the 
result of an increased manufacturing (18.8% annual growth in the post liberalization 
period as opposed to 7.8% during the ISI period) and agriculture sector expansion (6.2% 
annual growth in the post liberalization period as opposed to approximately 2% during 
the ISI period).286  Not only have exports increased considerably during the past three 
decades, the composition of these exports has drastically changed compared to historical 
trends.  In 1980, the mining and oil sector represented 64.2% of all exports, 
manufacturing 23%, and agriculture 9.9%.  By 2000, manufacturing had risen to 88% and 
the oil/mining and agriculture sectors decreased to 9.3% and 2.5% respectively.287  This 
change not only represents a clear break with the ISI policies of the past, but showcases 
how an economy can increase its growth potential through effective allocation of 
resources.  Mexico has a massive work force and with the signing of NAFTA, they have 
a relatively unimpeded path to the number one economy in the world (the United States).  
When the two factors are combined, it accounts for the massive uptick in manufacturing 
(a labor heavy sector) and the respective decrease in the oil and mining sector (a 
relatively labor light, but technology heavy sector).288  This effective reallocation of 
resources, which would not have been possible without the reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade, has increased the real GDP of Mexico by as much as 3% (as of 
2001).289  Even though this increase in real GDP is not a large number on its own, the 
liberalization of the Mexican economy undoubtedly, indirectly affected other aspects of 
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economic growth. One second order affect is its role in increased investor confidence 
which resulted in increased FDI inflows to the Mexican economy in the early 1990s.290  
Without this increase, the Mexican economy would probably not have experienced the 
economic resurgence that it has achieved up until this point. 
Even though the reduction of trade restrictions has clearly increased the rate of 
Mexican economic growth, it is only one aspect and at best, only partially responsible. 
The other aspect of the liberalization puzzle is the large number of FTA that Mexico has 
joined.  Since joining GATT in 1986, Mexico has increased their trading potential by 
establishing thirteen different trade agreements with 44 different countries.291  While this 
increase is clearly important to their overall globalization strategy, it has had its 
drawbacks.  In 1994, Mexico became a member of NAFTA; with this signing, Mexico 
has essentially fussed their economy with that of the United States (“The United States 
accounts for 85% of Mexico’s total external trade and 80% of the flows of foreign direct 
investments the country receives.”) and Canada.292  Even though this close relationship 
between the two economics has proven to be problematic in recent years, the benefits that 
Mexico has gained from this agreement far outweigh this negative aspect.293  
Additionally, to help mitigate this strong relationship, Mexico has sense joined several 
free trade agreements which have helped diversify their export portfolio.294  A good 
example of this is their negotiation of a FTA with the entire European Union (the only 
country to achieve such a collective FTA with the EU). 
This reduction of trade barriers and large number of FTA have clearly proven 
advantageous for Mexico and helped produce economic growth.  Even though it can be 
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hard to determine the exact amount of economic growth that trade liberalization is 
individually responsible for, it has undoubtedly aided in Mexico’s economic recovery 
from both the 1983 LDC debt crisis and 1994 Peso crisis.295 
C. RESULTS FROM COMBATING MONOPOLY POWER 
Chapter III showed a Mexican government who, after default, stood firm in their 
belief that the best economic system was based on free market competition with as little 
intervention from the state as possible.  The governmental leadership decided to not only 
liberalize the trade regimes, but also sell off the vast majority of SOE.  This was by no 
means an easy task and took the better part of a decade to achieve, yet by the early 1990s, 
the number of SOE had returned to pre–state intervention levels.296  Yet even with their 
massive commitment to reduce the level of state intervention, economic growth had not 
returned.  
The reason that the reduction of state owned enterprises, and subsequently, the 
combating of monopoly power did not yield the hoped for results, can be attributed to 
two different problems; the first points towards an ineffective privatization process.  Yes, 
the country did privatize a large number of SOE, but several monopolies simply 
continued to exist in the private sector, in essence transitioning from government run 
monopolies to private monopolies.  A prime example of this is the telecommunications 
industry in Mexico.   
Telmex was founded in 1947 when a small group of investors bought out 
Ericssons’ business.297  By 1950, when Telmex bought out the ITT Corporation, they 
were the only telephone company in the entire country.  Telmex continued to grow until 
1972, when the Mexican government nationalized the company.  Instead of the 
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government breaking up the monopoly once it was established in 1950, or not allowing 
the acquisition of ITT Corporation, they allowed it to continue to operate.  By 1972, ISI 
was in full swing throughout Mexico and so once again, instead of breaking up the 
monopoly it was nationalized.298  Once the decision had been made in Mexico to 
privatize the telecommunications industry after the introduction of Pacto, a small group 
of investors led by Carlos Sims acquired the lion’s share of the stock.  This was a result 
of the auction method and overall goal of the Mexican government.   
The overall goal of the privatization program was to raise as much money as 
possible for debt repayment through the selling of SOE.  Given this goal, the most 
important aspect of a decision on the part of the government to sell, was the final sales 
price.  In many cases, this was not merely a transfer of funds to the government from 
private investors, but involved complicated debt repayment structures and future profit 
allocations.  When this is compared to other countries experience regarding the selling of 
SOE, the price is but a small aspect of a larger overall strategy, designed to increase 
economic efficiency, consumer welfare, and resource allocation.299   
By 1990, the Mexican government had sold off the last stake of government 
ownership in the company.300  Although there are numerous phone companies operating 
throughout Mexico today, Telmex is still holds a death grip on the Mexican Phone 
Industry.  As of January 2012, Telmex controlled 80% of the land lines in Mexico and 
their offspring cellular provider, Telcel, controls 70% of the market.301  Even though this 
is just one example of how a private monopoly transitioned into a public monopoly, this 
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same story can be repeated by major corporations such as Ferrmex, Cemex, Bimbo, and 
Maseca.302  Even though they do all face minor competition, they are by far, the industry 
leaders and even though they do not fulfill the technical definition of monopolies, that is 
exactly what they are.303 
The incomplete results of the state run privatization program is the second reason 
why monopolies still limit Mexican economic growth.  Due to the Mexican constitution 
and the importance of certain key SOE, not all SOE / monopolies were privatized.  
Pemex, the oil company, and Federal Electricity Commission, the electricity provider, are 
still state run monopolies.  They are monopolies in the truest sense of the word; there is 
no competition allowed in their industry by law.304  This lack of complete privatization 
by the Mexican government has led to several major problems.   
As discussed in Chapter III, there tends to be a lack of R&D in monopolies.  In 
some industries this is not a major issue, but in industries where technology plays a lead 
role, a lack or R&D can lead to bankruptcy.  Pemex has found themselves trapped in a 
cycle where R&D has been neglected for too many years and now facing the 
consequences.  Once one of the oil producing giants of the western hemisphere, Pemex 
has now begun to show signs of a slowdown that could not only be bad for the company, 
but it could prove disastrous for the entire country.  Between 2004 and 2011, Pemex’s oil 
output has dropped an amazing 24%.305  This decline is largely the result of a complete 
absence of R&D resulting from a lack of financial resources needed for investment into 
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exploration (see Chapter III’s discussion on taxation).306  Currently, Mexican oil export 
revenues are considerably lower than they were at the beginning of the LDC Debt Crisis, 
16% as opposed to 35%, but the revenues still account for approximately 30–40% of 
government spending.307  Given how important Pemex is, the fact the Mexico is not 
reinvesting into the infrastructure and R&D of Pemex is astonishing.  Pemex’s main oil 
fields are showing signs of drying and if the current trend is not reversed, Mexico will 
become a net oil importer for the first time in its history by 2020.308  When this happens, 
the coffers of the government are going to run dry, leading to another massive economic 
crisis.  After all, when a country loses 16% of its GDP, it is going to affect the overall 
economy.  The only way to ensure that the oil revenue for the company and the country 
does not run dry, is to slowly allow outside companies to start drilling in Mexico; in 
short, start the privatization of Pemex.  Without outside financing or technology transfers, 
there is no chance of things improving.  Thankfully, this is what is finally happening.   
For the first time in 50 years, Pemex has allowed an outside firm to enter into 
Mexico’s restrictive oil and energy sector.  “Petrofac, a UK–based oil services company, 
won two of the three contracts on offer…The contracts, which involve developing 
existing onshore fields in southern Mexico, are tiny in scale, representing only about 1.5 
per cent of Mexico’s total proven reserves of just under 14bn barrels.”309  Even though 
this is a “tiny” amount of production, it is a huge step in the eventual privatization of 
Mexico’s oil production sector. 
Even though Mexico was able to reduce their debt, decrease the size of the 
government, and increase efficiency through the selling of the vast majority of SOE, 
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without the breakup of the largest state run and private monopolies, this commitment to 
free market economics will only produce marginal economic gains.  In order for Mexico 
to continue to economically grow, the government must continue to make strides in 
monopoly reduction and preventative legislation.  It is due to these reasons that the 
combating of monopoly power is at best only partially successful. 
D. RESULTS OF PACTO 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Pacto, this section will evaluate the four 
supporting goals designed to achieve a decrease in, and subsequent stabilization of, the 
inflation rate in Mexico. 
The first goal of restoring and subsequently maintaining international 
competitiveness was accomplished by depreciating the Controlled Preferential Rate by 
17.4% on 14 December, 1987, reducing the gap between the controlled and free exchange 
rate to approximately 1.5%.310  This depreciation was just the first in a long line of 
changes to the exchange rate system in Mexico that took place over the next five years 
until the new Mexican Peso was introduced on October 20th, 1992.  Some of these 
changes included:  a preannounced schedule of depreciations for the Peso, a constantly 
decreasing depreciation amount, the eventual simplification of the entire system from a 
two (and sometimes three) exchange rate system to a single, unified exchange rate 
system, and the introduction of a stabilization band designed to allow minor fluctuations 
in the exchange rate.311  These changes, when combined with other structural changes, 
resulted in increased consumer confidence that presented itself in the form of increased 
capital inflows into the Mexican stock market.312 
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The second goal was to strengthen the fiscal balance over the coming year.    The 
target for this goal was to raise the fiscal surplus by 3% of GDP in 1988.313  The methods 
used to accomplish this goal were increases in the prices of public goods and services, 
and increases in interest rates.314  By the end of 1988, Mexico’s current account as a 
percentage of GDP increased an astounding 3.5%.  Even though this was temporarily 
accomplished, it was unable to be maintained.  For the next five years the current account 
as a percentage of GDP decreased an average of 1.74% per year bottoming out in 1993 at 
negative 6.1%.315 
The third goal of further liberalizing trade policy was covered thoroughly in the 
sections above and will not be rehashed further.  However, the fourth goal of establishing 
a permanent basis for maintaining a social consensus on wages policy was a resounding 
success.  Pacto was responsible for the agreement between “the government friendly 
unions…representatives of the business community, and the government.”316  This pact 
was initially designed to run for two months, however due to constant renegotiations and 
extensions, Pacto endured from 1987–1993.317 
Given the general success that Pacto achieved in accomplishing three of the four 
afore mentioned goals, there should be no surprise that the Economic Solidarity Pact 
achieved its overall goal of reducing, and then maintaining a stable inflation rate.  This is 
clearly evident when viewing Table 2. 
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Figure 3.   Inflation Depreciation in Mexico318 
Pacto was directly responsible for the reduction in Inflation, wage inflation, and a 
reduction in the exchange rate through the explicit price agreements between business, 
labor, and the government.  Additionally, by allowing for the real appreciation of the 
currency, inflationary pressure was greatly reduced.319  These two government policies, 
coupled with the above mentioned measures used to achieve three of the four supporting 
goals of Pacto, led to dramatic decreases in inflation.   
Even though three of the four supporting goals were accomplished and the main 
goal of reducing and sustaining a stable inflation rate was achieved in the short run, 
several unintended consequences resulted from the programs long term, heterodox 
approach.  The number one fear in using Pacto, was the potential the program possessed 
to induce “significant real exchange rate overvaluation, loss of competitiveness, and very 
large trade deficits.”320  This is exactly what happened as a result of the 1989 decision to 
relax capital controls and allow the inflow of short term capital into the Mexican 
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economy.  This inflow of capital into the system, fueled expenditures that created a 
consumption boom, put additional pressure on an ever increasing real exchange rate, and 
further fueled the increase in the current–account deficit.321  These decisions played a key 
role in the onset of the 1994 Peso crisis.322  The 1994 Peso crisis may have been avoided, 
or at least the severity lessened, had the program been ceased earlier in the 1990s.  Once 
the inflation has been brought down to a manageable level, it is important to let the 
market correct itself and allow some inflation.  However, the decision was made that he 
program should be extended until after the 1994 election.323 
Even though Pacto played a major role in the 1994 Peso crisis, the program can 
still be considered a resounding success.  Without the reduction in inflation that occurred 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mexico would still be trying to recoup foreign 
direct investment and pay off outstanding international loans.  In short, without reducing 
and controlling inflation, something which no other program until Pacto was able to 
achieve, Mexico would be in a far worse position than they currently find themselves.   
E. RESULTS OF THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES THROUGHOUT THE 
TAX SYSTEM 
The 1988 tax code bill that was signed into law in 1989 was relatively modest in 
size, however, resulted in major changes to the tax structure and enforcement methods.  
This section will evaluate the results of the 1989 tax bill and the changes that are still 
needed to raise the Mexican tax system up to levels consistent with the remainder of 
OECD countries. 
The results of the relatively modest changes to the tax law / code are quite 
respectable.  In 1994, Mr. Aspe was quoted during a Forbes interview saying,  
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“Our more simplified system with lower rates and fewer taxes and tougher 
enforcement has produced government revenues that are up 33% in real terms. During 
these years the GDP has increased 11% in real terms, so one–third of this increased 
revenue is just higher economic activity. But two–thirds come from the new tax 
system.”324 
This increase in revenue is a direct result of the changes to the tax system.  A 
majority of this increase can be credited to the increasing the tax base, resulting from the 
removal of MTPs and STBs, as well as the inclusion of the mandatory 2% asset tax.  In 
addition to the increased tax base, the number of tax payers increased by over a million; 
some of this is no doubt due to population growth, but a greater majority is probably due 
to changes in enforcement and prosecution.325  Other statists are equally impressive:  total 
tax income has gone from 8.5% of GDP in 1987 to 10.8% in 1991.  Income tax rose over 
the same four years from 4.0% to 5.1%, and VAT income has grown from 2.7% in 1987 
to 3.3% in 1991.326   
Even with these very respectable increases in revenue, the biggest change might 
be in the administration of the new tax laws.  Due to the increased simplicity of the new 
tax code, the Servicio de Administracion Tributaria (SAT) now has the capacity to 
conduct effective audits.  Prior to these changes, the complexity of the tax system 
allowed firms to evade full payment of their taxes due to the inability of SAT to 
effectively enforce the current laws.  Even with these promising results, the tax code in 
Mexico still leaves much to be desired. 
The tax base has expanded considerably as a result of the 1988/89 reforms, 
however, more than 90% of the population is still not paying taxes or their share of 
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taxes.327  This is mainly due to the large informal sector of the economy (approximately 
1/3 of employed Mexicans work in the informal sector).328 In 2009 alone, tax evasion 
amounted to $25.6 billion dollars of lost revenue for the Mexican government.329  If the 
Mexican government hopes to raise revenue, it need not raise tax rates, implement new 
taxes, or even conduct a crackdown on the informal economy (none of which are viable 
political options), it need only increase its ability to collect taxes.   
Even though the results of the 1988/1989 tax reforms are impressive, there is still 
much work that needs to be accomplished in Mexico.  Even though the tax base has 
expanded, there is still considerable work that must be done in order to find a way to 
include the informal sector of the economy into the tax system.  The informal sections of 
the economy employs approximately 15.5 million workers with most paying little to no 
income tax.330  If Mexico found a way to effectively tax the informal sector, they could 
increase output of the economy approximately 17%, while at the same time reducing the 
tax rate from 26% to 16%.331  Even though these numbers are based on total 
enforcement, even a marginal increase in enforcement would benefit the economy.  In 
order for this to occur, the ability of the SAT to effectively collect and audit individuals 
and corporations would need to be considerably increased. 
Even after the 1988/1989 tax reforms were enacted (which simplified the tax 
structure), the tax code in Mexico is still extremely complicated and cumbersome for 
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individuals as well as corporations.  According to the World Bank, five key problems still 
remain that must be addressed if Mexico wants to fully utilize their current tax code:   
a) evasion is too easy–rarely discovered and even more rarely 
punished; b) the payment process, even by those willing to pay, is too 
difficult; c) the tax code is too complex; d) the application of the code by 
those who administer it is inconsistent across taxpayers and across time; 
and e) the system collects insufficient information and fails to use it 
well.332 
In order for Mexico to effectively increase their revenue, enforcement must 
become a top priority.  The reforms did help, however, in comparison to other OECD 
countries, Mexico still lags behind in resources, and results.  The administration must 
take a stand, not in policy, but with capital resources, training, and manpower to 
accomplish an effective auditing branch within the SAT and hold tax evaders accountable 
for their failure to abide by the law.  Only then, will Mexico be able to usher in an era of 
compliance as opposed to evasion. 
Only once a reliable and stable source of governmental revenue has been 
established can the final hurdle to an effective tax system be cleared…Pemex.  As of 
2001, Pemex has the following taxes levied against them:  a 35% income tax in the form 
of the Impuesto a los Rendimientos Petroleros (IRP); a duty on oil extraction which is a 
cash duty levied based on total revenue minus total approved expenditures of Pemex 
Exploration and Production (PEP).  It is levied at three different rates totaling 78.9%; the 
Petroleum Produces Tax, which is a gas and diesel tax levied against consumers; a Gross 
Revenue Tax levied against Pemex’s gross revenues for all operations at a rate of 60.8%; 
and a Price Cap which amounts to a 39.2% tax on all crude produced when the price 
exceeds the estimated budged price agreed upon by Pemex and the Mexican 
Government.333  These five different oil and gas taxes end up providing the Mexican 
government with federal revenues totaling between 2.1% and 4.5% of GDP based on 
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international crude oil prices on any given day.334  Until Pemex is released from the 
Mexican government’s death grip, they will continue to be on the slow road of declining 
profits until death.  It is completely acceptable to nationalize an essential business for 
national security proposes, as long as the revenue that is being produced is allowed to be 
reinvested as needed to ensure survival of the company.  As has previously been stated, 
this has not been the case for Pemex. 
Until these issues are corrected, the Mexican government will always be forced to 
maintain a low rate of governmental expenditures as a result of inadequate tax revenue.  
This will in turn, continue to hamper their development and economic growth for years to 
come.  It is because of these reasons that Mexico’s 1988 / 1989 tax bill is considered a 
short term success and a long term failure.  Until a major reform, not an incremental 
remodel of the tax code is completed, Mexico will maintain below OECD average 
governmental revenue, effectively limiting the future economic growth potential. 
F. RESULTS OF THE BANKING REFORM 
The banking sector reforms that were implemented following the 1994 Peso crisis 
were ambitious in nature and were designed to save Mexico from plunging into a second 
major economic crisis in as many decades.  The goals of the two major reform packages 
were to avert a total collapse of the banking sector, and induce systemic change so as to 
avoid a repeat of the current crisis.  In order to determine the success of the reform 
packages, this section will evaluate the weather the reforms accomplished their stated 
goals, followed by an evaluation of the current state of the Mexican banking sector as it 
relates to the systemic changes of the second phase of the reform program. 
The initial rescue package, implemented in 1995, that was designed to avoid the 
total collapse of the financial sector in Mexico was a success.  The liquidity window 
programs, combined with considerable funds from the IMF, the U.S., Canada, BIS, and 
the private banking community, allowed the Banco de Mexico and FORBAPROA to 
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issue loans that covered the necessary funds that the Mexico financial sector owed private 
and corporate lenders.335  The initial capitalization program was made available to banks 
that needed the extra capital to ensure they were in compliance with the 8% capital to 
asset ratio that the Basle Accords required.  Even though some banks undoubtedly 
required assistance and did take advantage of the government sponsored initial 
capitalization program, most banks were already in compliance with the accords.  When 
the crisis occurred in December 1994, the average Net Capital / Risk–weighted Assets 
ratio in Mexico was 9.72%.  As the crisis worsened, the ratio continued to improve: 
10.79% in 1995, 13.06% in 1996, and 17.22% in 1997.  It was not until 1998 that the 
ration dropped to 13.33%.336  Even though on paper, this ratio may look healthy, due to 
the lax accounting principles that were prevalent throughout Mexico in the early and 
mid–1990s, there is no doubt that the ratio was actually considerably lower than 
reported.337  Even with the questionable success of the initial capitalization program, the 
Banco de Mexico and FOBAPROA were successful at holding off a major financial 
sector collapse.  This allowed the Mexican authorities to turn their attention to the 
systemic change that needed to occur throughout the entire financial sector. 
The second phase consisted of several programs that were designed to prevent a 
systemic collapse of the financial sector.  The main program to accomplish this goal was 
the Capitalization and Loan Portfolio Purchase Program (CLPPP).338  The basic goal of 
the CLPPP was to reduce the number of non-preforming loans (NPL) present on the 
Mexican bank’s balance sheets.  Until NPL were removed from the balance sheet, the 
banks would remain insolvent.  Over the course of several years the number of NPLs did 
decrease, however, it did not happen as the speed at which the government has hoped for.  
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In fact, in the years directly following the onset of the Peso crisis, the percentage of NPLs 
actually increased.339  As some of the banks began to be unable to meet the requirements 
of the CLPPP, FOBAPROA began to take control of some of the banks daily operations, 
which eventually caused a decrease in the level of NPLs.  This decrease was not the sole 
effect of the CLPPP, but a combination of debtor relief programs, increased transparency 
and accounting practices, and increased capital requirements of the banks.  In the end, as 
a result of CLPPP, Anahuac, Capital, Cremi, Interestatal, Obrero, Oriente, Pronorte, and 
Union banks were liquidated and Serfin and Santander banks were merged with 
international financial institutions.340   
The lax regulatory framework in place that played a part in the 1994 Peso crisis, 
led to the demise of FOBAPROA.  To fill the void, the Protection of Bank Savings 
(IPAB) was created.  IPAB was modeled after the U.S. FDIC, and has played a key part 
in the continued low number of NPLs present in the Mexican financial sector.  To 
accompany IPAB, the Mexican GAAP was introduced which ensured increased 
transparency and responsible lending practices.  Even though these changes have helped 
ensure responsible lending, there is no way to point to a causal relationship between 
responsible financial lending and IPAB / Mexican GAAP. 
The most significant result of the financial reform package is the increased 
presence of foreign owned financial institutions that have come to dominate the Mexican 
financial system.  In 1994, of the 35 banks that were present in Mexico, only two were 
foreign owned and they only controlled 7% of the total banking assets.  Ten years later, in 
2004, that share of total banking assets controlled had increased to 83%.341  Even though 
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Mexico has lost some financial independence, this change will ensure that the Mexican 
financial system remains competitive on the international financial stage. 
Unlike the early 1990s, Mexico has learned from both the 1983 and 1994 
economic crisis.  Their large capital surpluses and low levels of NPLs have ensure that 
they are poised to ride out the current economic storm that is wreaking havoc on the rest 
of the world.342  Even though the current globalized economy poses risks, thanks to the 
painful lessons of the past, Mexico is poised to succeed in the future.  Because of the 
success of both the initial rescue package and the systemic changes enacted throughout 
the Mexican Banking Sector, the banking reform measures can be considered a 
resounding success. 
G. CONCLUSION 
After two decades of economic and financial crises, Mexico is still experiencing 
slow economic growth.  As can be seen above, even though economic and financial 
reforms were implemented, the results were mixed.  Trade liberalization and the banking 
reforms can be considered a success, but the controlling of inflation, combating of 
monopoly power, and tax reform pose a mixed bag.  Is Mexico’s lack of economic 
growth a result of this lack luster implementation of the afore mentioned reforms, or is it 
due to some other factor…something bigger.  This is the question that will be discussed 
in the conclusion. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis presented information regarding the economic policies that the 
Mexican government chose to pursue following the 1983 LDC debt crisis and the 1994 
Peso crisis.  Yet given this large amount of information, the principle question regarding 
Mexico’s lack of economic growth remains unanswered.  Close examination has revealed 
two possible reasons that may have contributed to Mexico’s lack of economic growth; 
due to the incomplete nature of the economic reforms that were implemented following 
both economic crises, the Mexican economy remains constrained.  The second possible 
explanation points to the possibility that economic reforms alone only address the 
symptoms, not the actual cause.  This conclusion will address each of the two afore 
mentioned explanations and recommend a possible alternative route to economic growth.  
The last section will look towards the future and determine if any recent programs are 
attempting this “alternative” approach to economic growth. 
It is clear that the economic reforms that were implemented following both the 
1983 LDC debt crisis and 1994 Peso crisis were both long overdue and absolutely 
needed.  The analysis presented in Chapter IV showed that although the reforms were 
needed, not all were effectively implemented.  Trade liberalization following the 1983 
LDC debt crisis and the banking reforms following the 1994 Peso crisis were both very 
well executed and can be considered successful; however, the government’s controlling 
of inflation, combating of monopoly power, and tax reform measures were only 
marginally successful.  If these reforms were only marginally successful, then they must 
have effected Mexico’s future economic growth.  The question then becomes how much 
was the economy restrained by these ineffectively implemented reforms? 
The use of Pacto shows that although the Mexican government was able to 
control the rate of inflation, it was a major contributor to the 1994 Peso crisis.  However, 
the quick recovery following that crisis far outweighs the alternative of hyperinflation, or 
at a minimum, sustained extreme inflation.  So, although Pacto was a major contributor to  
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the onset of the 1994 Peso crisis, it is not a contributor to restrained economic growth.  
However, the inability of the Mexican government to effectively combat monopoly 
power is a different story completely. 
The government’s marginally effective auction methods regarding the breakup of 
monopolies, although effectively reducing the size and therefore cost associated with 
running SOE, did effect future economic growth.  As previously discussed, the economic 
costs associated with monopolies will have a clear long run effect, especially in terms of 
technology advancements and transfers, as well as, a lack of R&D, all resulting in 
reduced consumer surpluses.  These monopoly practices clearly restrained overall 
Mexican economic growth, however, to what extent is hard to accurately estimate.  In 
some cases, such as Bimbo’s baked products empire, where monopolistic practices only 
marginally effect consumer surplus (if at all), plays little to no role in restraining 
economic growth.  On the other hand, in companies such as Telmex, Pemex, and the 
Federal Electricity Commission, where technology plays a key role, the effect of 
ineffective monopoly regulation has greatly restrained economic growth.  Until these key 
sectors are liberalized, Mexico’s economic growth will remain restrained.  Also, the 
government must stop using Pemex as their personal “piggy bank.”  Until Pemex’s tax 
burdens are reduced, the company will continue to be unable to effectively reinvest in the 
necessary infrastructure and R&D that it requires to regain competitiveness in the 
international commodities market.  Pemex’s ridiculously high tax burden is merely the tip 
of the ice berg when it comes to problems regarding Mexico’s tax structure. 
Mexico’s 1988/1989 tax reform bill, although increasing government revenues 
and the tax base, is only a temporary fix to a tax system requiring a major overhaul.  The 
tax system in Mexico still remains a very complicated system in which evasion is a 
systemic problem.  Until Mexico finds a way to effectively and efficiently combat 
evasion, the tax system will prove to be a burden to economic growth.  This is not a 
simple fix and more importantly, not one that can be accomplished through government 
initiatives alone; it will require a mind shift of the Mexican populace.  This is not 
something that happens overnight and more importantly, it is in direct conflict with the 
 97 
large number of people employed in the informal economy.  How Mexican officials plan 
to address the informal economy in terms of tax revenue remains an unresolved issue.  
These are all major issues that will require not just money, but time and patience.  Even 
with the large problems that the Mexican tax system presents, government spending only 
marginally effects economic growth.343  Furthermore, following the 1983 LDC debt 
crisis, Mexico has adhered to strict government spending requirements so not to place 
their country into another financial crisis.  This fiscal responsibility combined with 
relatively small government revenues, ensures that tax revenue will only marginally 
affect economic growth. 
So, even though three of the five major reforms following the 1983 LDC debt 
crisis and 1994 Peso crisis were only marginally effective, their impact on long term 
economic growth remains minimal.  This leads directly towards the second possible 
explanation as to why Mexico economic growth remains lackluster; economic reforms 
alone proved to be insufficient to achieve economic growth in line with Mexico’s 
economic potential.  To achieve greater economic growth, Mexicans need to address 
major social issues that continue to plague their society.  As discussed in Chapter I, there 
has been considerable work done regarding the link between individual social factors and 
how they influence economic growth.  According to current scholarship, there are several 
troubling social issues that Mexico must address in order to accelerate their rate of 
economic growth.  Large amounts of poverty, rampant corruption, an ineffective 
education and judicial systems are just some of the issues which Mexican officials must 
continue to address if they hope to take full advantage of their economic potential. 
The National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy has 
recently reported that the number of Mexican living in poverty has increased from 49 
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million to 52 million.344  These numbers are staggering in an absolute sense, however, 
when viewing them against the total population in Mexico, which amounts to 46.2% of 
the population living in poverty.  With nearly half of the country living in poverty, there 
is no surprise why Mexico is not experiencing rapid economic growth.  The economic 
impact of having half of your countries population living below the poverty line is 
staggering.  These individuals and families are concerned with surviving, not starting a 
small business or increasing their individual rate of production.  Until poverty can be 
reduced, the human capital in Mexico will continue to be trapped in a self–repetitive 
cycle resulting in more poverty and continual restrained economic growth.345  Just as 
poverty is on the rise in Mexico, so is corruption.   
Corruption is rampant in all aspects of the Mexican government.  From the 
highest levels of state control down to individual police officers, corruption is affecting 
economic growth throughout the state.  The direct costs of corruption (bribery, extortion, 
ect.) are not necessarily high, it is the secondary and third–order costs associated 
corruption that result in restrained national economic growth.  When a country has large 
amounts of corruption, international companies are going to be less likely to invest or 
open up a branch in that country.  This leads to minimal foreign direct investment, as well 
as reduced private investment.346  Until corruption is reduced, Mexico will continue to 
miss out on key investment opportunities. 
These few examples of social issues influencing economic growth fill volumes in 
development journals and textbooks.  Yet, if Mexico was able to fix every single social 
issue present, it would still not result in sustained economic growth if the economic 
foundations were not in place.  It is this combination of both social and economic reforms  
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that Mexico requires to ensure sustained economic growth.  Until both the economic and 
social issues are addressed, Mexico will continue to be a country trapped in a cycle of 
underproductive.   
This idea of socioeconomic reforms has gained considerable international 
attention due to the resurgence of the Brazilian economy.  Through their social spending 
initiatives, such as Bolsa Famiela, they have been able to redistribute wealth, reduce 
poverty, increase the education of their children, and increase the health of their 
population.347  Although the social spending programs in place in Brazil require an 
extremely high tax rate (combined corporate tax rate for 2012 is 34%), it is addressing 
both the social and economic problems plaguing their country.348  Although the 
differences between Brazil and Mexico are many, it shows that by addressing social and 
economic issues together, economic growth is possible.  Mexican officials are heading 
the lessons of their Latin American counterparts, and are attempting to address their 
social and economic issues through international aid programs, as well as, domestic 
initiatives. 
Internationally, through a partnership with the United States, Mexico is 
attempting to revise their aging and ineffective judicial system in an effort to combat 
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO).  In 2008, the Mexican Senate finally passed a bill 
reforming the Mexican judicial system.  This bill transitioned the Mexican Judicial 
system away from the Spanish Inquisitional system, or civil law based system towards a 
common law system (similar to the U.S. judicial system).349  This decision to completely 
change the way in which the judicial system is structured will reduce corruption as well 
as increase transparency and the public’s faith in their system.  At first it is hard to see the 
economic benefits of a judicial reform, however, upon closer evaluation, it becomes 
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clear.  By increasing transparency and reducing corruption, Mexico will have taken an 
important step towards combat DTO, as well as providing an important indicator to the 
international community that Mexico is becoming a more stable and safe place to conduct 
business.  The U.S. has backed the Mexican initiative and has pledged their support, both 
monetarily, through expenditures allotted to the Mérida Initiative, and through 
partnerships, such as the special training assistance programs taught by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for Mexican Federal Prosecutors.350   In the long run, by addressing 
their difficult social problems, Mexico will increase FDI as well as private investment, 
thereby increasing economic growth.  Even though this is just one example, it is a step in 
the right direction. 
In closing, regardless of the flaws, Mexico has implemented meaningful and 
lasting economic reforms which have partially laid the foundation for prolonged 
increased economic growth.  Although there is more work to be done on the economic 
issues address in this paper, until Mexico addresses their numerous social issues, their 
economic growth will remain at its current level.  However, through continued economic 
and social reforms, Mexico can return to growth levels that rival that of the “Mexican 
Miracle.” 
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VI. TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix is designed to aid in the understanding of economic issues through 
the use of basic economic theory.  For each of the major economic reforms implemented 
following the 1983 LDC debt crisis, there is a complimentary section designed to help the 
most inexperienced economic readers in their understanding of basic economic theory.  
In each section, I have applied basic economic principles and theory towards the specific 
problem that Mexico was experiencing following the 1983 LDC debt crisis.  By looking 
at the basic economic theory behind the principles, it will help the reader understand why 
the Mexican authorities choose the route they did on their way to economic freedom and 
prosperity.  
B. TARIFF THEORY 
Let’s assume that a tariff has been placed on steel imports into Mexico.  By 
placing this tariff on steel, Mexico is forcing consumers to buy domestically produced 
steel instead of steel imported from the U.S.  In economic terms, this would be called 
increasing producer surplus.351  Prior to the tariff, the producer surplus is equal to the 
area IDE (refer to Figure 4).  After a tariff is imposed, this area is now equal to IAB 
(refer to Figure 4).352  The tariff is responsible for a gain of an area equal to ABED (refer 
to Figure 4).  Even though this has led to an increase in producer surplus, it has also hurt 
the consumers.  Under the neo–classical model, consumers will either buy less steel, or 
they will pay a higher price, or any combination of the two.353  In Economic terms this 
loss is considered decreasing consumer surplus.354  Prior to the tariff, consumer surplus is 
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represented by an area equal to JHD (refer to Figure 4).  After the tariff has been 
implemented, consumer surplus has fallen to JCA (refer to Figure 4).  The loss of 
consumers is represented by the area ACHD (refer to Figure 4).355  The last element of 
the tariff levied on the Mexican steel industry is how much the government gains from 
the tariff.  Economic principles tell us that because of the price increase, the amount 
supplied will be less and the amount requested in the market will be less.  This reduced 
supply is represented as a movement from P1 to P2 (refer to Figure 4).  On the demand 
side, it is represented by movement from P4 to P3 (refer to Figure 4).  Because of this 
movement, the government gains are equal to the area FBCG (refer to Figure 4).356  Once 
you tally up the increases in government gains and producer surplus and subtract those 
from the consumer losses, you will find that a net loss in the Mexican steel industry has 
occurred.  Graphically this can be represented by the two triangles EBF and CGH (refer 
to Figure 4).357  These are the inefficiencies that tariffs produce, and this is why almost 
every economic institution regards tariffs as the incorrect way to adjust the economic 
situation of a given industry. 
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Figure 4.   Tariffs in Mexico’s Steel Industry 
In reality, this is not necessarily what happened in Mexico.  The tariffs that were 
imposed were placed so high, that they are designed to almost completely keep 
competitive imports out of the economy.  If products were allowed to enter the market, 
they are priced in a way that the domestically produced product is considerably cheaper.  
So much so, that due to the lack of perceived difference in quality, almost no one will 
purchase the import.358 
C. MONOPOLY THEORY 
In some instances, a monopoly is not a bad way to organize a sector of the 
economy.  For example, in the defense sector, the fact that there is only one National 
Army is a benefit of monopoly control.  Due to the cost of maintaining an army or navy, 
if there were two firms it would be extremely expensive and would harm consumers.  
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However, in most circumstances, competition creates a better product and lowers costs 
for consumers.  Basic economic principles uncover several problems with monopolies:  
first, due to the fact that there is only one firm producing a product or rendering a service, 
they have the ability to earn higher than normal profits, which in turn, reduces economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare.359  Second, due to the lack of competition present in 
monopolistic sectors, there is a lack of innovation and Research and Development (R&D) 
that occurs.360  These problems are further examined below. 
As compared to a perfect competition model, monopolistic competition is a 
slightly more complicated model.  First, because there is only one firm, the demand curve 
for the industry is the demand curve for the single firm (refer to Figure 5).361  
Additionally, marginal revenue for the firm will have to be plotted. Marginal revenue is 
the change in total revenue from producing one more unit of output; thus marginal 
revenue will lie below the demand curve (refer to Figure 5).362  Also, marginal cost must 
be plotted.  Similar to marginal revenue, marginal cost is the increase in total cost from 
producing one more unit of output.  For the purpose of this simple example, you can 
think of marginal cost being equal to the supply curve (refer to Figure 5).363  In order the 
maximize profits, the monopoly will choose to produce a quantity where marginal 
revenue is equal to marginal cost.  In order to determine what cost should be charged, 
monopolies follow the intersection up to the demand curve and figure price (refer to 
Figure 5).364  Next, average total cost curve needs to be plotted.  This is just a 
mathematical formula that is equal to the total cost divided by the quantity produced.365 
                                                 
359 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 201. 
360 Ruffin and Gregory, Principles of Economics, 663–664. 
361 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 204. 
362 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 205. 
363 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 206. 
364 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 206. 
365 Lieberman, Introduction to Economics, 207. 
 105 
 
Figure 5.   Monopolistic Competition Model 
Just as before, now that the basic graph is drawn, one can start to determine if it is 
advantageous for Mexico to maintain their monopolies or to change structures and 
privatize.  On the very basic level, it is known that monopolies produce less output at a 
higher price.  In a perfectly competitive model, the firm would choose to produce where 
supply equals demand.  Monopolies understand this, however, they produce where supply 
(in the case of monopolies, their marginal cost) equals marginal revenue (refer to Figure 
6).366 
                                                 




Figure 6.   Monopolistic Competition compared to Perfect Competition 
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Figure 7.   Producer and Consumer Surplus in Monopolistic Competition Model 
Producer and consumer surplus in Monopolies have the same definitions as they 
do in perfect competition, however, they look drastically different.  In monopolistic 
competition, deadweight loss is represented as an area equal to CGH.  Producer surplus 
decreases by an area equal to FGH and consumer surplus decreases by an area equal to 
CFH (refer to Figure 7).367  Just as in the case of tariffs, there is a net social loss, hence 
the reason most developed countries do not tolerate monopolies.   
The second problem that monopolies induce is a lack of competition.  A lack of 
competition is not necessarily bad (just as in the case of the military), however, this lack 
of competition produces several second order issues; the biggest of which is the lack of 
innovation.  When there is a lack of competition, firms do not devote as many resources 
into R&D.  This leads to a lack of innovation.  Under perfect competition condition, this 
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firm would simply be eliminated, however, because there is no competition present in 
this sector, the firm continues to survive.  Additionally, because there is only one firm 
present in this sector of the economy, the national sector of the economy falls behind 
others nations level of innovation.  This national lack of innovation is usually mitigated 
by other international companies producing similar products, however, when an economy 
is closed, this sector has no reason to devote resources towards R&D.  It is this type of 
second and third order consequences that hurts Mexico once the economy was 
liberalized. 
D. BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES BEHIND INFLATION 
Before analyzing Mexico’s solution to inflation, a basic level of knowledge must 
be achieved in regards to what inflation is and how it compounded Mexico’s economic 
troubles.  “Inflation is defined as a sustained increase in the general level of prices for 
goods and services.”368  Even though this can be a hard concept to grasp, it is easier to 
look at inflation in terms of purchasing power.  “As inflation rises, every dollar you own 
buys a smaller percentage of a good or service.”369  According to the IMF, inflation can 
“distort prices, erode savings, discourage investment, stimulate capital flight (into foreign 
assets, precious metals, or unproductive real estate), inhibit growth, makes economic 
planning a nightmare, and, in its extreme form (called hyperinflation), evokes social and 
political unrest.”370  There are two main types of inflation; demand–side inflation and 
supply–side inflation.371  “Demand–side inflation occurs when the amount of money 
                                                 
368 “All About Inflation,” Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/inflation/inflation1.asp#axzz1W4grbi00 (accessed on 2 April, 
2012). 
369 “All About Inflation,” Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/inflation/inflation1.asp#axzz1W4grbi00 (accessed on 2 April, 
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370 Guy Debelle, Paul Masson, Miguel Savastano, and Sunil Sharma, Inflation Targeting as a 
Framework for Monetary Policy (International Monetary Fund, 1998), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues15/index.htm (accessed on 02 April, 2012). 
371 There are many different subsets of the two main categories of inflation listed, however, they all 
fall under the demand-side and supply-side categories. 
 109 
purchasers of goods and services want to spend increases more rapidly than the supply of 
such goods and services, resulting in the bidding up of prices.”372  This category of 
inflation is often referred to as “demand pull” inflation.  “Supply–side inflation occurs 
when increases in prices of inputs caused by reductions in their supply generally cause 
fewer goods and services to be offered at prevailing prices, resulting in the bidding up of 
their prices.”373  This category of inflation is often referred to as “cost push” inflation.  
Even though inflation is dangerous, especially when it reaches rates that Mexico 
experienced in the 1980s, a little inflation is not necessarily bad.  
1. Economic Theory Behind Inflation Rates 
In the real world, not the self–imposed, controlled world that basic economic 
models are designed to work within, many indicators and variables are interrelated.  For 
the purpose of this argument, the main indicators concerning inflation are GDP and 
unemployment.  As was determined earlier, in order for Mexico to economically recover 
from the 1983 LDC debt crisis, long term growth must be achieved.  If overall output of 
an economy is holding steady, companies cannot make profits, subsequently, leading to a 
lack of GDP growth.  However, if the overall output is growing too fast, inflation will 
also increase at a greater rate.  There is general consensus that a GDP growth rate of 2.5–
3.5% is the highest percentage change that the U.S. economy can sustain without 
inducing negative consequences.374  Developing economies can sustain a higher GDP 
growth rate without suffering negative consequences, however, there is still a fine 
balance between growth and inflation.  To understand the negative effects of increased 
GDP growth, unemployment is introduced into the equation.  Historical data has shown 
that for every full percentage point GDP growth increases over 2.5%, national 
                                                 
372 Ruffin and Gregory, Principles of Economics, 101. 
373 Ruffin and Gregory, Principles of Economics, 101. 
374 Ryan Barnes, “The Importance Of Inflation And GDP,” Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/06/gdpinflation.asp#axzz1quhJDjpc (accessed on 02 April, 2012). 
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unemployment rates decreases by 0.5%.375  While this decrease in unemployment can be 
beneficial in some cases, if the trend continues uninterrupted for a considerable period of 
time, it can have devastating consequences for the national economy.  As an economy 
approaches full employment, two unintended consequences occur:  first, aggregate 
demand for goods and services will increase faster than supply, causing prices to rise, and 
second, companies will have to raise wages as a result of the tight labor market.376 This 
increase usually is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices as the company 
attempts to maximize profits.  These two trends, over time, will result in increased 
inflation.  If this situation is allowed to continue for any considerable length of time, this 
cycle will have a self–perpetuating effect.377  This brief explanation of the negative 
consequences of inflation illustrates why the Mexican government had to slow their rate 
of inflation.   
E. TAX THEORY 
This section will not concentrate on the complex theories associated with taxation, 
but will focus on the main aspects of what makes a tax code effective.  As was previously 
notes, the main problem in Mexico is their inability to bring in a sufficient amount of 
revenue given their public expenditures.  Several aspects of the tax system can be 
evaluated in hopes of increasing the efficiency of the tax system.  They include the tax 
structure, buoyancy of revenues, revenue stability, excess burdens, and economic 
distortions. 
                                                 
375 Ryan Barnes, “The Importance Of Inflation And GDP,” Investopedia, 
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This example is based on the demand-pull inflation, however, the interrelated nature of GDP, prices, and 
unemployment are the same regardless of the inflation type. 
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The tax structure of Mexico is generally in line with most modern countries.378  It 
is a highly centralized country, with approximately 88% of general government revenue 
resulting from federal revenue.379  The number one source of revenue for the federal 
government is still income taxes.  The Value Added Tax (VAT) is the second most 
lucrative source of revenue for the government.  The third most important source of 
revenue for the federal government is hydrocarbon duties paid by PEMEX, followed by 
excise taxes.380  What is different about Mexico is the amount of revenue generated by 
PEMEX.  When evaluating all different revenue streams, PEMEX provides 34% of the 
total federal government’s revenue.381 One of the most important aspects of the Mexican 
tax systems is the level of complexity that is built into the system.  Because of the 
complexity of the tax system, Mexico often has to deal with high rates of tax evasion due 
to enforcement problems.382  Even though Mexico’s tax structure appears to be properly 
constructed (according to the adequate level of tax effort as a percentage of GDP), there 
is far too much reliance on PEMEX for revenue.383 
An important aspect of a well–designed and properly functioning tax code “is the 
ability to generate automatic growth in fiscal revenues over time.”384  In other words, as 
the economy grows, so should the ability of the tax system to collect additional revenue.  
At a minimum, the tax system should grow at the same rate as GDP.  Buoyancy is “the 
ratio of the proportional change in tax revenues to the proportional change in the tax base 
                                                 
378 Dalsgaard, “The Tax System in Mexico,” 8. 
379 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 9 
380 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 12–13; 
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of GDP.”385  From 1983 to 1994 (the period between the LDC debt crisis and the peso 
crisis), buoyancy for federal tax revenue averaged 0.85.  Table 2 breaks down the federal 
tax revenue to each of the four major revenue sources based on buoyancy.  Because this 
number was slightly below unity (unity represents the tax system growing at the same 
rate as GDP growth), the Mexican government was increasing their current account 
deficit.  This is due to the Mexican government providing more goods and services than 
the tax revenue could support.  Had the buoyancy been 1.00 or higher, they would have 
been able to either spend more money, increase goods and services to the public, or 
decrease the current account deficit (holding all other spending static).386 
 
Table 2.   Buoyancy of Federal Revenue in Mexico (From Martinez–Vazquez, Mexico: An 
Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 44) 
Revenue stability is often times a useful measure to determine if a tax system is 
properly structured.  Revenue stability is the examination of the difference in variation 
relative to their mean over time.387  If a government collects too much tax from unstable 
sources, during a time of economic downturn, it will not be able to render the services 
that it is required to.  Revenue instability is not necessarily a bad feature of the tax 
system.  If revenue instability moves in sync with the business cycle, it can be a good 
thing.  If tax revenue moves more violently when compared to the business cycle, it will 
                                                 
385 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 15; Gemmell, 
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table 7. 
387 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 17 
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act as a stabilizing force during growth and contraction cycles.  However, if they move 
counter to the business cycle, tax revenue can have a destabilizing effect on the 
economy.388  Mexico during the 1980s and early 1990s, showed two distinct patterns:  
first, tax revenue moved in sync with the business cycle, and second, non–tax revenues, 
mainly hydrocarbon duties, showed no discernible pattern.  Unfortunately, due to the 
relative importance of hydrocarbon duties, compared to tax revenue, the formers 
influence on the economy was stronger.389  When this is coupled with “pro–cyclical 
discretionary tax policy (tax rates are increased during recessions and decreased during 
expansions)… Mexico’s tax system has provided an unstable foundation to the federal 
budget and the behavior of overall revenues has tended to increase rather than dampen 
the swings in real economic activity induced by the economic business cycle the federal 
tax revenues proved to be relatively.”390 
Finally, an evaluation of excess burdens and the economic distortions that they 
produce should be conducted.  When certain sectors of the economy are taxed at a lower 
rate, a need to collect additional taxes in another sector of the economy is created.  This 
action created considerable consequences, one of which resulted in the miss–allocation of 
resources.  This created an excess burden of taxation, which amounted to the economy 
producing less than optimal levels of income.391  By closing some of the loopholes 
present in the tax system, a more efficient allocation of resources could be achieved, 
thereby, reducing the number of unintended consequences of a complex tax code.392  
There are measures that can be attempted to calculate this (such as the marginal effective 
tax rate), however, on a fundamental level, anytime an economy is less intruded upon, the 
                                                 
388 “States’ Revenue Estimating” by the PEW Center on the States and the Nelson A Rockefeller 
Institute of Government, March 2011, 3. 
389 Dalsgaard, “The Tax System in Mexico,” 23. 
390 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 18–19. 
391 Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System, 19–20. 
392 Martin Wolk, “Why the tax system keeps getting more complex:  An 'endless cycle' of loopholes, 
crackdowns imposes an economic cost,” MSNBC.com, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12307554/ns/business-eye_on_the_economy/t/why-tax-system-keeps-
getting-more-complex/#.T3SxptWyFZJ (accessed on 02 April, 2012). 
 114 
more efficient the system will work.393  Based on this assessment of the Mexican tax 
code and administration, a solution was required. 
                                                 
393 There is also considerable attention paid to the reallocation of resources, however, for the purpose 
of this thesis, the more important issues is the lack of funds collected by the government. 
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